A note on cognate objects: cognition as doubling

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Abstract
This note considers some of the problems raised by so-called “cognate objects” in the light of Hale & Keyser’s (1993, 1997, 1998) analysis of unergative verbs, which involves incorporation of a noun occupying the internal argument position. Unless we assume that the cognate object is post-syntactically inserted in the internal argument position (which already contains a trace/copy left by the element undergoing incorporation), this element should not be licensed. I propose that this tension can be solved if the incorporating noun (or root) and the cognate object start off as part of the same syntactic object: a big NP/DP. From such perspective, cognition can be seen as a subcase of a more general phenomenon: doubling.

1. Introduction
In this short paper I would like to study a puzzle raised by so-called “cognate objects” (e.g. John sing a song; see Jones 1998, Massam 1990, Mittwoch 1998, Moltmann 1990, Pereltsvaig 1999, 2001, and references therein for background and discussion) if analyzed within Hale & Kayser’s (1993 et seq.) l-syntax framework, whereby unergative verbs (sing, eat, cry, drink, sleep, etc.) involve a process of incorporation of a bare noun into a light verb, as depicted in (1).

* A previous version of this paper was presented at the NORMS Workshop on Argument Structure (Lund University, Lund, 4 - 6 February 2008), whose audience I thank for questions. I am grateful to Ignacio Bosque, Jon MacDonald, Jaume Mateu, Gemma Rigau, Juan Uriagereka, and two anonymous reviewers for valuable comments and suggestions. Special thanks to Antonio Fábregas for his interest in this work. Usual disclaimers apply. This research has been partially supported by grants from the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia-FEDER (HUM2006-13295-C02-02), and from the Generalitat de Catalunya (2009SGR-1079).

1 A reviewers asks about the “incorporation” / “conflation” distinction. I understand the former roughly in Baker’s (1988) sense: as a head-movement process. The label “conflation” is borred from Talmy by Hale and Keyser, but the distinction seems to be largely vacuous:

Conflation is a specific kind of incorporation, conforming to an especially strict version of the Head Movement Constraint […] We will, in general, use the term “conflation” rather than “incorporation” in reference to the process involved here, in order to distinguish it from incorporation in the sense of Baker (1988), noting, of course, that the two notions are closely related and may ultimately prove to be the same thing.

[from Hale & Keyser 1998:80-81]
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(1) VP
   V do
   N sing

As (1) shows, the incorporation of the N *sing* (or, alternatively, the root √SING, in an approach à la Marantz 1997, 2001) leaves no structural space for the cognate object *a song* to appear—unless we assume that this element is post-syntactically inserted in the position occupied by a copy of *sing*.

I refer to this puzzle as *cognation paradox* and propose to solve by taking cognition to involve the same syntax underlying another well-known phenomenon: cletic doubling. From such perspective, “cognate objects” do not occupy the same position of the element undergoing incorporation—as Hale & Keyser (2002) reason—, but a position internal to a complex NP/DP (as argued for by Belletti 2005, Cecchetto 2000, Torrego 1994, Uriagereka 1988, 2001, 2005). This solution is shown in (2):

(2) VP
   V do
   NP
      DP N
      a song

I further push this doubling-based approach to “hyponymous objects” (e.g. *John sang a copla*) and preposition cognation (e.g., *Juan salió fuera* – Eng. Juan went out out; see Mateu & Rigau 2009), assuming that the incorporating element and its double deploy a “part – whole” relationship, as argued for by Uriagereka (2001, 2005) in the case of clitics.

Discussion is divided as follows: Section 2 introduces the details of the *cognition paradox*, which ensues from the application of Hale & Keyser’s (1993, 1997, 1998) analysis of unergatives. In section 3 I put forward an analysis of cognition that adopts the basic insight behind doubling structures. Section 4 argues that this very analysis of doubling can be readily applied to what Mateu & Rigau (2009) call “P-cognition”, again with no need to invoke overwriting of post-syntactic insertion. Section 5 summarizes the main conclusions.

2. The cognation paradox

In Hale & Keyser (1993), a subgroup of intransitive verbs, namely unergatives, is treated as being covertly transitive, assuming that the
internal argument undergoes incorporation into a light verb (in the sense of Baker 1988). Hale & Keyser (1993) argue that the internal argument is a nominal head, thus capturing the denominal character of most unergatives:

So-called unergative verbs [...] represent by and far the simplest class of denominal verbs derived by incorporation [...] their initial lexical projection is simply that of a verb and a nominal complement [...] this structure is the same as that projected by verbs such as make (as in make trouble), have (in have puppies), and do (as in do a jig). The difference is that the lexical structure representation of an unergative verb, like laugh, involves incorporation, into an abstract V, of the nominal head N of its NP complement. [from Hale & Keyser 1993:53]

Hale & Keyser (1998:83-84, 113-115, 2002:117) further observe that, in many languages, unergative verbs are spelled-out as verb-noun compounds or light verb constructions (plausibly due to the fact that the light verb is non-incorporating in such languages). One such language is Basque, where unergatives are formed by a light noun plus the light verb egin (Eng. do).

(3) a. Oihu egin
    shout do-INF
    ‘Shout’ (Basque)

b. Barre egin
    laugh do-INF
    ‘Laugh’

c. Lo egin
    sleep do-INF
    ‘Sleep’ (Basque) [from Hale & Keyser 2002:117]

Departing from their initial (i.e. 1993) take, Hale & Keyser (2002) argue that confflation is to be understood not as in Baker (1998) (see fn. 1), but rather as a post-syntactic process of phonological signature copying. In particular, the noun (or root) merged in the internal argument position contains certain phonological information that is copied into the (phonologically empty) V position. Hale & Keyser (2002) call this information “p-signature” (the “vocabulary item” of Distributed Morphology approaches), and they redefine confflation as follows:

(4) Conflation
    Conflation consists in the process of copying the p-signature of the complement into the p-signature of the head, where the latter is “defective” [Hale & Keyser 2002:63]
Assuming that the p-signature of light verbs can be defective (empty), conflaton can thus be said to be compulsory in languages like English, but not Basque.

Most importantly, Hale & Keyser (2002:49) notice that their proposal is threatened by cognate argument constructions of the type represented in (5):

(5)  
   a. They danced a Sligo jig  
   b. He shelved the books on the windowsill  
   c. Leecil saddled old Gotch with his new Schowalter  

As these authors argue, the elements Sligo jig, on the windowsill, and with his new Scholwalter should be ruled out, since they apparently duplicate an already conflated dependent. More specifically:

The sentential syntactic object in [5a], a Sligo jig, cooccurs with the presumably conflated N dance. Unless something else is involved here, this should be impossible. It would be impossible, other things being equal, if conflaton were movement leaving a trace in complement position, under the standard assumption (perhaps incorrect) that lexical insertion cannot take place into a position occupied by a syntactic object (whether that is an empty category or not).

To tackle this problem, Hale & Keyser (2002) make a series of assumptions. To begin with, they establish a distinction between “true cognate object constructions” and “hyponymous object constructions”—the latter involving an argument that is not root-identical to the element that undergoes conflaton:

(6)  
   a. She slept the sleep of the just Cognate object  
   b. He laughed his last laugh Cognate object  
   c. He danced a jig Hyponymous object  
   d. He bagged the potatoes in a gunnysack Hyponymous object  

As has been pointed out in the literature (Jones 1988, Massam 1990, and references therein), cognate and hyponymous objects show non-trivial syntactic asymmetries: Unlike hyponymous objects, true cognate objects can only take root-identical nouns (see (7a)), cannot be passivized (see (7b)), cannot undergo A-bar movement (see (7c)), require a modifier (see (7d)), shows definiteness effects (see (7e)), and cannot be pronominalized (see 7f)): 

(7)  a. *She slept her last nap
    b. *A silly smile was smiled
    c. *What did he die?
    d. *He died a death
    e. *He smiled the smile for which he was famous
    f. *John slept the sleep of the just and Bill slept it too

[data adapted from Hale & Keyser 2002:71 and Massam 1990:164-165]

From these facts, Hale & Keyser (2002:72) conclude that true cognate objects obtain through incorporation, not conflation (understood now as p-signature copying). If this is so, then it is possible to account for the “strict cognate” relation, given that incorporation involves copying of a given lexical item. Crucially, as Hale & Keyser (2002) point out, this analysis of cognate objects must assume that the lower copy is spelled-out “presumably because English does not allow stranding of determiners, modifiers, and the like”. As for hyponymous objects, Hale & Keyser (2002:92) suggest that the verb is directly inserted in the V position, the internal argument slot being licensed by a classificatory relation between certain semantic features it shares with V (indicated in curly brackets as a subindex):

(8) \[
\begin{array}{c}
V \\
V_{\{\text{DANCE}\}} \quad N_{\{\text{DANCE}\}} \\
\text{DANCE}
\end{array}
\]

In order to derive a hyponymous object such as (6c) (i.e. *He danced a jig), Hale & Keyser (2002) assume that the verb dance is directly inserted in the V position, whereas the N position is licensed through V’s semantic content, which establishes a “classificatory binding relation” between the semantic features of this head and the N position. Such semantic licensing forces the N jig to be interpreted as a ‘kind of dance’. 2

Such (hyponymic) semantic relation between V and N is possible in (i) and (ii), but not in (iii) and (iv), due to the ‘light ‘ (i.e., semantically weak) nature of the latter.

(i) John sings
(ii) Mary dances
(iii) *Mary makes
(iv) *Mary does

In Gallego (2010), I suggest that the deviance of (iii) and (iv) follows not from the weak semantic status of the light verbs make and do, but to the fact that the φ-Probe contained in v does not find any matching Goal—in the case of (i) and (ii) the Goal is the (presumably defective) N that undergoes incorporation.

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2 Such (hyponymic) semantic relation between V and N is possible in (i) and (ii), but not in (iii) and (iv), due to the ‘light ‘ (i.e., semantically weak) nature of the latter.
Though technically plausible, the analyses just sketched in order to account for both cognate and hyponymous objects seem a bit contrived, and in fact make Hale and Keyser add different retouches to their previous treatment of unergative verbs. In the following section, I put forward a proposal of cognate and hyponymous objects that will combine Hale & Keyser’s (1993, 1997, 1998) original analysis of unergatives and Uriagereka’s (1988, 2001, 2005) approach to doubling.

3. Cognition as doubling

My starting point in order to overcome the cognition paradox is Hale & Keyser’s (1993, 1997, 1998) analysis of unergative verbs as hidden transitives. As noted above, if unergatives are hidden transitives, then there is no way for the DP a song to be licensed in an example like the following:

(9) John sang a song

In this paper I want to argue that so-called cognate (and hyponymous too, although I return to this later) objects involve a doubling strategy, analogous to the one seen with clitics and floating quantifiers (see Belletti 2005, Ceccheto 2000, Sportiche 1988, Torrego 1994, and Uriagereka 1988, 2001, 2005). In particular, just like the real argument of the verb ver (Eng. see) is the clitic la in (10a) (and not the double María), the real object of the light verb hacer (Eng. do) in (10b) is the abstract root √BAILE (Eng. dance) (and not the double un tango):

(10) a. La vi a María (Río de la Plata Spanish)  
CL-her saw-1.SG to María  
‘I saw María’

b. María bailó un tango (Spanish)  
María danced-3.SG a tango  
María danced a tango

The structures I have in mind for these instances of doubling are depicted in (11), following the Torrego-Uriagereka trend of having the doubling generated as an adjunct/specifier.

3 For an alternative approach to cognition still within a decompositional framework, I refer the reader to (Ramchand 2008:91 and ff.).

4 A reviewer suggests to replace the root √BAILE with √BAIL, since that the verb has a different ending (i.e. bail-ar). I keep √BAILE under the assumption that this element is not to be taken as the homophonous noun baile (Eng. dance), but rather as a purely conceptual abstract unit devoid of morpho-phonological content.
The object position of the clitic is occupied by a little pro in (11a) (as Torrego originally proposed), but, as the reader can see, there is no element occupying the object position of the root √DANCE in (11b) (a conclusion reached by Mateu 2002 and Kayne 2011 on independent grounds). In order to avoid this loophole, I will simply assume that real argument may merge directly with its double, following Belletti (2005) and Cecchetto (2000). This is shown in (12), where I represent the entire VP structure.

The main advantage of (12) is that it allows us to offer a technical way to avoid the problem noted by Hale & Keyser (2002): Under a doubling account, cognate objects do not have to be inserted over a copy (or a trace), since both elements, the real object and the double, are there as a complex unit from the start.

Additional evidence suggests that this analysis is worth pursuing. First, both clitics and bare nouns (or roots) appear to require incorporation in the languages we are considering, and both are analyzed as heads (the analysis is forced in the case of clitics if they take a little pro as complement, as just argued). Second, both clitic and root object are less rich in their conceptual content than the double/cognate. Third, I follow Uriagereka (2001, 2005) and assume a “part-whole” (“possessed - possessor”) semantics for the

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5 The same reviewer asks why roots and clitics incorporate—and not the double. He/She suggests that it may be due to its defective status. There is actually more than one possible answer. One could argue that the double is an adjunct (or a specifier), so it is actually out of the incorporation-path, or that incorporation may target any of the dependents, the wrong result causing a crash at the interfaces. For concreteness, though, I will assume that incorporation fails due to the complex (phrasal) status of the doubles.
cases of cognate and hyponymous objects. If correct, this would allow us to get rid of the general problem that cognate objects pose, but also to dispense with the semantic mechanism that Hale & Keyser (2002) propose to license the interpretation of hyponymous objects. Let me elaborate on this point. According to Uriagereka (2001, 2005), syntactic doubling can provide the semantics of possession (in the sense of the Kayne 1993 and Szabolcsi 1983/1984): this is transparent in the case of (13a), where there is a possessive relation between María and her cord, but it is also plausible for (13b), where Uriagereka (2001, 2005) takes the clitic to be associated to a null classifier with the rough semantics of ‘persona’—this would be responsible for the referential reading that doubling clitics deploy:

(13) a. Yo le vi el cordón a María (standard Spanish)
   I CL-her saw-3.SG the cord to María
   ‘I saw María’s cord’

b. Yo la vi a María (Spanish, doubling varieties)
   I CL-her saw-3.SG to María
   ‘I saw her (to) María’

The structure Uriagereka (2001, 2005) proposes for doubling is shown in (14). As can be seen, it contains three layers: (i) a small clause, which encodes conceptual (ultimately thematic) dependencies; (ii) an RP, whose specifier hosts the element that acts as a referential anchor; and (iii) a DP, which is responsible for determining contextual/grounding effects (in the sense of Higginbotham 1988 and Raposo & Uriagereka 1995).

(14)         → context confinement
     DP
        → referentiality
           D
          RP
            → possession
              R
                SC
                  SPACE
                  PRESENTATION
                  WHOLE
                  PART
                  DP
                  NP
                  María
                  cordón

In the case of a sentence like (13a), for instance, the derivation involves movement of the NP cordón to the [Spec, RP] position, so that the entire DP comes out referring to a cord—and not to María. Finally, the DP layer is responsible for capturing a further interpretive fact: it is not the same to speak of a decontextualized cord of María’s (alienable possession) than of a cord of María’s which is contextualized to her (inalienable possession). The element that moves to [Spec, DP] determines what reading we have: if
cordón moves, then the cord is an integral part of María; if María does, then it is not.\(^6\)

With this much as background, let us go back to cognate and hyponymous objects (see (15)), which I want to compare with doubling (see (16)):

(15) a. María cantó una canción Cognate object (Spanish)
   \(María\) sang-3.SG a song
   ‘María sang a song’
   
b. María cantó una balada Hyponymous object (Spanish)
   \(María\) sang-3.SG a ballad
   ‘María sang a ballad’

(16) a. Juan la vio a María (Spanish)
   \(Juan\) CL-her saw-3.SG to María
   ‘Juan saw her (to) María’ (≡ Juan saw María’s persona)
   
b. Juan le vio el ombligo a María (Spanish)
   \(Juan\) CL-her saw-3.SG the navel to María
   ‘Juan saw María’s navel’

The syntax I am advocating for is shown in (17) and (18) (for (16) and (15) respectively):

(17) Doubling (possession)
   \([_{DP} \ldots [_{RP} \ldots [_{SC} \text{SPACE PRESENTATION } ] ] ] \]
   SPACE (WHOLE) \(\rightarrow\) María
   PRESENTATION (PART) \(\rightarrow\) persona (16a) / navel (16b)

(18) Cognition / Hyponymy
   \([_{DP} \ldots [_{RP} \ldots [_{SC} \text{SPACE PRESENTATION } ] ] ] \]
   SPACE (ROOT) \(\rightarrow\) √SING
   PRESENTATION (COGNATE/HYPONYMOUS)
   \(\rightarrow\) a song (15a) / a ballad (15b)

Taking stock, the advantages of the present proposal can be summarized as follows:

(19) a. Under a doubling analysis, there is no overwriting, post-syntactic insertion, or semantic licensing of cognate/hyponymous objects. Moreover, a doubling structure crucially provides “more room” so

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\(^6\) A reviewer asks me to elaborate on this interpretive relation. Following Uriagereka (2001, 2005), I assume that part-whole dependencies are equivalent to possessor-possessed ones, being established through a small clause. In order to further distinguish alienable from inalienable possession, the possessed element (here, the cord) must raise to [Spec, DP].
that we can have an incorporating element (the clitic, the root) and a non-incorporating element (the double, the cognate/hyponymous object).

b. The semantics holding between the root and the cognate/hyponymous object is analogous to that holding between a clitic and its double within Uriagereka’s (2001, 2005) proposal.

c. The structure in (18) treats the merger of the root and cognate/hyponymous object as a small clause, which I take to be unlabeled (following Chomsky 2008, Moro 2000). If we further assume, with Mateu (2002), that root cannot take complements, then the cognate/hyponymous object cannot be a complement, and thus it cannot incorporate (since incorporation is restricted to elements occupying the complement position; see Baker 1988, Uriagereka 1988).

Before considering some questions and problems that this proposal must face, I would like to propose an extension of a doubling account to cognition in the realm of P-to-V incorporation.

4. Preposition cognition

As noted in section 2, Hale & Keyser (2002) observe that, apart from cognate and hyponymous DPs, there can also be hyponymous PPs, as those in (5b, c), repeated here for convenience:

(20) a. He shelved the books on the windowsill
    b. Leecil saddled old Gotch with his new Schowalter

[from Hale & Keyser 2002:49]

Hale & Keyser (2002:94 and ff.) point out that verbs like those in (20) typically permit omission of the PP, since the relevant P has already undergone incorporation/conflation into V. For consistency with their proposal, these authors assume that locatum/location verbs “have the lexical semantic features required to license a nonovert [P N] that our hypothesis assumes to be structurally present in the sentences [without the PP]” (p.94). Hale & Keyser (2002:95) put forward the analysis in (21) for cases where there is no PP cognition, assuming that the light verb is coindexed with the object of the preposition (the P projection being somehow porous so that the dependency is local):
When the PP is overt, on the other hand, there must be a “special semantic relation” between V and the object of the preposition. Thus, in (22), “there is a coherence between the verb and the object of the preposition: a milkpen qualifies as something that could be used to contain calves in the manner of a corral” (p. 96):

(22) I corraled the calves in the milkpen  [from Hale & Keyser 2002:95]

Apart from locatum/location verbs, there are other verb classes that feature a PP that apparently duplicates a locative or path component incorporated into the verb (sometimes visible as a prefix; see Fábregas 2010 and references therein for discussion). Consider, in this respect, the paradigm in (23), which contains a variety of so-called preposition government verbs in Spanish (see RAE-ASALE 2009:ch.36):

(23) a. Ana se interpuso entre Carlos y tú (Spanish)
Ana  SE stepped-in-3.SG between Carlos and you
‘Ana stepped in between Carlos and you’

b. No pude desligarme de mis aficiones (Spanish)
not could-1.SG free-myself-1.SG of my hobbies
‘I could not free myself of my hobbies’

c. He colaborado con la policía (Spanish)
have-1.SG cooperated with the police
‘I have cooperated with the police’

d. Eso depende de su actitud (Spanish)
that depend-3.SG of your attitude
‘That depends on your attitude’

e. Tuvimos que competir con todos (Spanish)
had-1.PL that compete with all
‘We had to compete with everybody’

f. Juan compartió el pan con su compañero (Spanish)
Juan shared-3.SG the bread with his colleague
‘Juan shared the bread with his colleague’

Putting aside the precise nature of these prepositional arguments (see Gallego 2011 for an analysis that builds on a previous proposal of Violeta Demonte’s), the key thing to note is that the same preposition appears to be
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present in the verb, as a prefix (sometimes in Latin form): *inter-entre*, *de(s)-de*, *co-con*, *in-en*, *de-de*, *com-con*, and so on.

I would like to approach this class of verbs by combining Marantz’s (2001, 2005) treatment of *destroy* and a doubling analysis adopted in the previous section. To be specific, I assume the syntax of (24) for an example such as (23f): 7 8

(24)

I would like to contend that the same analysis can be applied to what Mateu & Rigau (2009) call “P cognation” in cases like *ir abajo* (go down), *echar fuera* (throw out), *bajar abajo* (descend down), *sacar adelante* (put forward), and *volver atrás* (turn back) in Spanish and other Romance language, where an abstract path preposition is incorporated into the verb and, at the same time, is spelled-out—apparently redundantly.

Adopting Hale & Keyser’s (2000) analysis of English particles as involving the (late) insertion of a preposition in the position occupied by resultative predicates (e.g. *John heated the soup up*), Mateu & Rigau (2009) contend that the relevant adverbial elements in VPs like those above are “inserted in the relevant P [position] after the verb has been formed” (p.

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7 A reviewer notes that, from a lexicalist point of view, it could be argued that the preposition is part of the root (being a frozen remnant of Latin or some previous stage). The analysis in (24) makes sense for those cases in which the prefix makes a semantic contribution (*co-laborar*, *des-abrochar*, etc.), but doubts emerge when it does not (*consistir*, *in-sistir*, *re-matar*, etc.). Marantz (2001), however, argues that even for the latter cases, a decompositional approach is valid as long as the (manner) root is productively attached to other particles: *de-stroy*, *con-struct*, *in-struct*, *ob-struct*, *re-structure*, etc. One such case in Spanish would be *insistir* (Eng. insist), where *in-* has no clear negative or locative meaning, but the alleged root can combine with other prefixes: *re-sistir*, *consistir*, *de-sistir*, *ex-sistir*, *a-sistir*, *per-sistir*, etc.

8 I am putting aside verbs that can select more than one preposition (e.g., *conectar* {*con/a*}). Perhaps some of these cases involve two prepositions that contain the same abstract specification, with post-syntactic competition of different vocabulary items, as a reviewer suggests.
Although plausible, I believe this proposal is problematic for the same reason I believe cognation poses a problem for Hale & Keyser’s (1993) treatment of unergatives: It involves overwriting/destroying an already created structure (the adverb/preposition is inserted in a position that is occupied by another adverbial/prepositional element, prior to conflation). This should be barred under any current formulation of Emond’s (1976) structure preservation hypothesis.\(^9\)

From the perspective I am adopting, there is no need to talk about “P cognation” in these verbs, but “P doubling”. The most immediate advantage of this approach is that it allows us to dispense with overwriting (insertion over a copy) or multiple copy pronunciation accounts.

Let us sum up. In this section I have tried to show that an analysis of cognation phenomena can be applied to cases where Ps are doubled. If correct, this suggests that the empirical coverage of the proposal put forward in the previous section goes beyond cognate and hyponymous objects, and can be considered for certain Romance facts: prepositional objects and what Mateu & Rigau (2009) dub “P cognation”.

5. Conclusions

An old empirical puzzle inherited from the tradition concerns so-called cognate objects, which are described as arguments that extract their meaning from the verb (RAE 1973;§3.5.1.c). As the data in (25) show, the semantic relation between morir and muerte, dormir and sueño, or vivir and vida is virtually that of synonymy.

\(^9\) An alternative is suggested by Fujii & Yoshida’s (2008) analysis of “preposition doubling” in English. The cases studied by these authors are like (i), taken from Pullum (2007):

\begin{enumerate}
  \item A thing [of which I am afraid of] is the maintenance effort to sort out the user input [from Fujii & Yoshida 2008:1]
\end{enumerate}

The proposal made by Fujii & Yoshida (2008) is that the lower copy of the preposition of is spelled-out because, by time linearization applies, it has become invisible. I cannot discuss the specifics of this approach here.
Along with these cognates, languages also display hyponymous variants, where the object denotes a subtype of the class of elements encoded in the verb:

(26) a. Cantar {una canción / una copla}  
sing a song a copla  
(Spanish)  
b. Beber {una bebida refrescante / una Fanta}  
drink a drink fresh a Fanta  
(Spanish)  
c. Comer {una comida asturiana / una fabada}  
eat a meal Asturian a fabada  
(Spanish)  

In contemporary studies, another cognition-like process has been the focus of much research: Clitic doubling. Following that intuition, I have argued that cognation phenomena can be analyzed in terms of doubling, taking the bare noun or root that incorporates into V and the cognate/hyponymous object to form a complex constituent—much like clitics and doubles do. This basically solves the puzzle that arises if one adopts Hale & Keyser (1993, 1997, 1998) analysis of unergatives as hidden transitives. However, even if this result alone is valuable in and of itself, there are many open issues that still require an explanation. Let us briefly consider some of them.

The doubling approach could be extended to cover unaccusative structures featuring cognation, but it cannot readily explain why—in most cases—a modifier is needed:10

(27) a. John sang a (beautiful) song  
b. John died a *(peaceful) death

Haugen (2011) suggests that modification is compulsory so that spelling-out both copies of the relevant N is not pragmatically redundant—violating Grice’s Maxim of Quantity. Although pragmatic constraints may be

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10 As Jon MacDonald (p.c.) points out, cognate objects are accepted without a modifier on an interpretation in which there may be some implicit modifier, like “the best”, “the most important”, “the one and only”, etc., which arises with focus on a definite determiner: I danced THE dance, I drank THE drink. Similar examples (with an idiomatic interpretation) are “I talk the talk”, and “I walk the walk”.
relevant here, I doubt that they can accommodate facts like (28): canto (Eng. chant) and canción (Eng. song) are roughly equivalent, but only the latter is ruled out as a cognate object. I take this to indicate that it is morphology (or morpho-syntax), rather than pragmatics, that is relevant for the data under consideration.

(28)  
a. El artista cantó un canto *(gregoriano) (Spanish)
\textit{the artist sang-3.SG a chant Gregorian}  
\textit{The artist sang a Gregorian chant’}

b. El artista cantó una canción (pop) (Spanish)
\textit{the artist sang-3.SG a song pop}  
\textit{The artist sang a pop song’}

It is also unclear why verbs like \textit{sleep} cannot take hyponymous objects in English, while they can in Spanish. In other words, why we can have (29b), but not (29a):

(29)  
a. *John slept a nap

b. Juan durmió una siesta (Spanish)
\textit{Juan slept-3.SG a nap}  
\textit{‘Juan slept a nap’}

Jaume Mateu (p.c.) further asks why we cannot have (30a) if we can have (30b):

(30)  
a. The sky cleared (*very clear)

b. John shelved the books (on a beautiful shelf)

A solution may follow from the nature of (clitic) doubling too. I know of no cases of adjective doubling (that would explain (30a)), but I do know of cases (in Catalan) were oblique dependents (i.e. PPs) are doubled.

Finally, the present account must also leave for further research the observation that cognate objects have an adverbial reading (that is, (31a) is equivalent to (31b)), and why certain cognates are expressed as adjuncts in some languages, as in (32b) (see Jones 1988, Pereltsvaig 1998, and references therein; data are taken from Real 2008 and Rodríguez Ramalle 2003):

(31)  
a. Juan vive una vida placentera (Spanish)
\textit{Juan live-3.SG a life pleasant}  
\textit{‘Juan lives a pleasant life’}

b. Juan vive placenteramente (Spanish)
\textit{Juan live-3.SG pleasantly}  
\textit{‘Juan lives in a pleasant way’}
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(32)  

a. He died a slow death

b. Murió de una muerte lenta (Spanish)

died-3.SG of a slow death

‘He died because of a slow death’

These and certainly more questions are still waiting for an explanation. I just hope that the doubling approach advocated for here helps understand the phenomenon of cognition, which, as we have seen, goes beyond the realm of objects, and brings us to the ill-understood domain of the argument/adjunct distinction and cross-linguistic variation.

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