

The Peace Treaty of Fredrikshamn and its Aftermath in Sweden and Finland

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By the end of 2009, in both Finland and Sweden the bicentennial commemoration of the dissolution of the common realm was drawing to a close. At the same time, what was being celebrated was the birth of an autonomous Finland. These commemorations have offered a rare occasion to explicate the annexation of Finland into the Russian Empire and the issues involved in it. Rather less to the fore has been the union of Sweden and Norway, which was also a consequence of the Finnish War of 1808–1809, at least when seen in a pan-European context.¹

In what follows, I shall concentrate on analyzing the Peace Treaty of Fredrikshamn of September 1809 and its consequences. Thus I will not deal with the Finnish War as such. It is widely accepted that the war in Finland was one of the side effects of the French Revolution and the chain of European-wide unrest and revolutionary upheaval that followed in its wake. We also know that relations between Sweden and Russia were relatively good at the turn of the nineteenth century, and indeed again soon after 1809. All these factors have a bearing on the Peace Treaty of Fredrikshamn.

The war continued in Norrbotten and Västerbotten in the spring and summer of 1809, after Finland had been occupied by the Russian forces in the autumn of 1808. The Swedish defence was not made any easier by the fact that the commanders of the main Swedish forces left their units to join the heated political game that was being played out in Stockholm, the consequence of which being Gustavus IV Adolphus' deposition in March 1809. In Norrland fighting continued, albeit with little enthusiasm on either side, as far south as Nordmaling below Umeå. Sweden, exhausted by the war, sued for peace, and the negotiations commenced in mid-August in Fredrikshamn.²

I shall now discuss the peace treaty itself and its short- and long-term consequences for the societies of Finland and Sweden in the transition from war to peace. Here it is important to compare both the different parts of the realm and,

to some extent, the chronological manifestation of the consequences. First, I shall consider the main substance of the peace treaty since it has not been analyzed as a whole, despite its crucial significance for both Finland and Sweden: it defined the present border between Finland and Sweden and determined the basis for Swedish foreign policy. Moreover, it can be claimed that this peace treaty was the last in which some 'permanent solution' was reached for Sweden; in this respect, the Peace Treaty of Kiel, signed with Denmark in January 1814, was only temporary, for the personal union with Norway brought about by it lasted only for some one-hundred years.³

Peace Negotiations and the Peace Treaty

Negotiations for peace started in mid-August 1809 in Fredrikshamn (Finnish: Hamina) in 'Old Finland' (the parts of Finland ceded by Sweden to Russia in the eighteenth century). It was quite clear to all the parties involved that even a partial restoration of Finland to Sweden was out of the question, at least for the time being. The Swedes had no room to manoeuvre; rather it was a question of how much they would have to cede to Russia. The preconditions laid down by the Russians were the following:

1. Sweden was to make peace with France, Denmark and Norway.
2. Sweden was to give up its alliance with England and join the Continental Blockade.
3. Sweden was to cede Finland together with the Åland Islands and the northern areas along the Kalix River to Russia.⁴

These conditions were almost realized *in toto* in the final peace treaty. The first condition was easy enough for the Swedes to fulfil because both the Swedish government and the people yearned for peace. The second condition was significantly connected with the situation at the outset of the Russo-Swedish war: such an arrangement had not suited Gustavus IV Adolphus. However, he had been deposed and his policies jettisoned, which meant that the 'problem of the old power' was no longer an issue. Certainly, in Finland particularly, government officials remained in their posts since their irremovability was one of the central principles inherited from the Gustavian period that still remained in force.⁵

The third condition was awkward in many respects. Finland had been lost *de facto*, and unfortunately there was little room for discussion concerning its fate.

However, for the Swedes, the Åland Islands' falling into Russian hands posed a serious security threat, for it was considered—as an outworn saying has it—to be 'a pistol pointed at the forehead of Stockholm' or a 'dagger in the heart of Sweden'. However, there was in fact no dispute at all because the Swedes' situation was hopeless; the Russians occupied the Åland Islands, which had nevertheless belonged to 'Finland' for a long time and thus passed over to Russia along with the Province of Turku and Pori. In this situation, the Swedes had no trump cards to play.⁶

The proposal that the border between Sweden and Finland should run along the Kalix River was very difficult for the Swedes to accept. The region was very thinly populated, but the inhabitants were mostly Finnish-speakers, and both the Swedes and the Russians knew that it was rich in iron ore.⁷ In fact, this was the only Russian precondition that the Swedish negotiators were able to successfully challenge. The northern border between Sweden and Russia—and thus later also Finland—was drawn along the Torneå and Muonio rivers, and is still in place today. Hindsight would show that this was not necessarily the best possible solution, since the problems of the border region were accentuated by the new frontier.⁸

The peace treaty was signed after a month's negotiations on September 17, 1809. It was published already in the same year, which was unusual in Sweden because after lost wars the central government tended to maintain silence over such matters,⁹ but in this case it was necessary for the new authorities to make the treaty public in order to justify their actions; they had to establish and retain legitimacy after the difficult times of war. Furthermore, the treaty entailed considerable administrative changes, especially in northern Sweden, that had to be implemented swiftly, and therefore the rationale behind them had to be clear and based on the provisions of the peace treaty.¹⁰

The treaty consisted of just twenty-one articles. In addition to matters concerning the ending of hostilities, the four major areas of emphasis in the treaty's provisions for Sweden were the following:

1. The restoration of peace between Sweden and France and its allies and participation in the Continental Blockade (Articles 2 and 3)
2. Territorial losses of Sweden to Russia (esp. Articles 4 and 5)
3. The safeguarding of the status of Finns and Swedes in the new situation (esp. Articles 6, 9 and 10)
4. Safeguarding the continued functioning of economic activity (Articles 13 to 18)¹¹

The first area of emphasis mainly aimed at exhorting Sweden to conduct peace negotiations with France and Denmark-Norway. And this is what happened shortly after the Fredrikshamn Peace Treaty was signed; Sweden made peace first with Denmark in December 1809, and then with France in early January 1810. Sweden also joined the Continental Blockade, and thus in a way was 'forced' into the Napoleonic Wars. The second area was intended to institute a long-term if not permanent state of affairs (see further details in Section III).

The provisions of the third and fourth areas were to be implemented within a set period of time. These provisions were intended to secure both the rights of the subjects in a period of transition, and to ensure that 'the old order' should not continue forever. Quite soon after the treaty was signed, all the parties to it—the Swedes, the Finns and the Russians—wanted to end mutual trade preferences in particular. However, such relations were not broken off completely at any stage. For instance, Finns continued to study in Swedish higher engineering colleges, and quite a few economic experts and all sorts of entrepreneurs came to Finland from Sweden, especially from the 1840s onwards.¹²

Territorial Losses to Russia

Sweden's main loss to Russia was Finland. Over the ensuing centuries, there has been much discussion about how 'Finland' should be defined and its value appraised, but the fact remains that the 'eastern' part of Sweden had definitely enjoyed a special status within the realm. One can still come across interpretations according to which Sweden ceded 'only some eastern provinces' to Russia in Fredrikshamn. This reading is limited in that it is based on just one article (the fourth) of the treaty, and does not take into account the whole document or the realities of the time. It is true that 'Finland' is not mentioned as a concept in this one article in which the territories to be ceded are strictly defined, but the article represents only about five percent of the contents of the treaty. On the other hand, 'Finland' as a concept appears in different forms in five articles, that is, in almost one in four.¹³ The above-mentioned fourth article stipulated that Sweden should cede the following territories to Russia: the Provinces of Turku (Åbo) and Pori (Björneborg), Kymenkartano (Kymmenegård), Uusimaa (Nyland) and Häme (Tavastland), Savo (Savolax) and Karjala (Karelen), Vaasa (Vasa), and Oulu (Uleåborg). Also 'the region belonging to the territory of Västerbotten up to the Torneå River' was to be incorporated into the Russian Empire. Thus the area to be ceded consisted of six provinces and the region between the Torneå and

Muonio rivers: see the following map (printed in 1793) representing the Kingdom of Sweden before 1809. The original 'Swedish Finland' is shown in yellow.

The designation 'provinces' (*höfdingadömen*) was used for these territories as being the easiest, clearest and most accurate term. The problematic region was that of Västerbotten: the Swedish negotiators in Fredrikshamn stated that the regions west and north of the Kemi River were part of 'Sweden'—and therefore the Russians should limit their demands to Finland proper. One of the representatives of Sweden in the peace negotiations in Fredrikshamn was Colonel Anders Fredrik Skjöldebrand, who was also an expert in the affairs of Lapland. He answered the demands of the principal Russian negotiator, Foreign Minister Nikolai Petrovich Rumyantsev, as follows: 'You must understand that it behoves the honour of the Emperor not to demand a part of Sweden. It is enough that you have taken Finland.'¹⁴ Because parts of Västerbotten and Kemi Lapland were also to be joined to the Grand Duchy of Finland, the new border had to be defined as clearly as possible. In actual fact, it was not a case of Sweden ceding only some of its provinces, as is clearly apparent in the Swedish debates during and immediately after the war.

Thus Sweden lost one half of the realm in the Peace Treaty of Fredrikshamn, half the main territories of which had belonged to it for over six-hundred years. The fact that the matter was settled in the end without too much room for misunderstanding made it easier for the defeated Swedes, but for the recipient, Russia, it was all a matter of mere rhetoric. As we know, Russia compromised by guaranteeing exceptional privileges for Finland, a policy that for its part is indicative of the latter country's real significance.

Safeguarding the Status of Finns and Swedes and the Continuity of Economic Activity

The treaty safeguarded the status of Finns in Sweden and that of Swedes in Finland—after the treaty these distinctions became possible with the separation of the two halves of the Swedish realm. The treaty laid down that the exchange of prisoners of war should take place quickly, and that those persons who wished to return to their 'home country' could do so freely within three years of the ratification of the treaty. The essential point for Finland and the Finns was briefly mentioned in the sixth article, which stated that His Imperial Majesty the Tsar had already guaranteed 'the religion, rights of property and privileges' of his Finnish subjects, and that these matters did not need to be addressed in the treaty. Behind

all this was the fact that Tsar Alexander I, at the Diet of Porvoo (*Borgå landtdag*) half a year before the signing of the treaty, had already guaranteed the privileges of the Finnish estates together with other rights, 'constitutional laws' and religious freedom. The Swedes insisted that these should also be mentioned in the peace treaty, but the Russians refused to repeat the Emperor's promises.¹⁵

The treaty made careful provisions for the protection of private property, which was of crucial importance for both Sweden and Russia, especially with regard to the legitimacy of the administration, the pacification of society and the safeguarding of the infrastructure in both countries. These matters concerned the members of all four estates, but the Nobles and the Burghers in particular.

The continued functioning of the economy on both sides of the Gulf of Bothnia was secured by issuing very general but at the same time comprehensive regulations on how 'Finns' could continue to import ore from Sweden to supply the needs of their iron industry, and 'in general all other products of the Swedish realm'. The Swedes in turn had the right to conduct trade with the Finns in cattle, fish, grain, fine linen, tar, timber, and 'in general in all other products of the Grand Duchy'. In other words, at first everything was maintained just as it had been, until October 1811. The stipulated time period for the continuation of trade was eventually prolonged until 1817, although the trade preferences of both parties were progressively cut down. From 1818 onwards, Swedish customs policy grew considerably more stringent, the formerly important exportation of Finnish grain to Sweden, for instance, almost ceasing altogether. The Swedish Diet repeatedly discussed the special status of Finland in Swedish trade after the late 1810s, and the special arrangement between the countries was ended in the early 1840s. At the same time, another important reform not directly connected with this was implemented; the use of Swedish currency in Finland came to an end with the redemption of Swedish money in 1840. Only in northern Finland and in the regions ceded from Västerbotten to Finland was Swedish currency still valid.¹⁶

The Consequences of the Peace Treaty in Sweden and Finland

The signing of a peace treaty is naturally an important step when societies return to peace after a time of war. However, the restoration of peace cannot be dealt with only as a chronological series of events, nor can it be regarded as a clear-cut process. This is evidenced by the period after 1809 in Sweden and Finland, although the problems in their societies were in some respects quite different.

An apt concept to describe this peace restoration process is ‘the crisis of peace’, and all the Nordic countries experienced such a crisis around 1809. The concept describes the overall situation surrounding a society’s return from a state of war to one of peace. It is not possible in this text to analyze its full ramifications, and I shall deal with it on the general level of state power. In normative terms, one can discern numerous common problems caused by the resumption of peace, problems which present grave challenges to the ability of the state and society to function properly, and which indeed represent downright threats to them. The most important general problems caused by the post-war resumption of peace can be described in the following manner.¹⁷ Firstly, it involves the pacification of society: this includes measures for strengthening or re-instating the legitimacy of the government, the general demobilization of troops, the punishment of those who are to blame for the war—especially if it has been lost — and so on. Secondly, it is necessary to minimize the psychological trauma caused by war: this involves healing the mental state of the nation through the commemoration of the war in various ways.

In the ‘new Sweden’ around 1809, the most important of these problems, beyond the heavy losses experienced by the country, included the difficult question of the next ruler, issues relating to the legitimacy of the government, economic difficulties, internal unrest and the challenges the situation presented for the making of foreign policy.

In Finland, the problems were of a different kind. Finland had been extensively and effectively pacified by time of the Diet of Porvoo in the spring of 1809. The Finnish forces had been disbanded, which quickly defused any potential political crisis relating to the military situation. Furthermore, since Finland was granted an autonomous position within the Russian Empire only with regard to internal affairs, it was unaffected by any foreign policy problems. In terms of its customs and constitutional law, Finland continued to live according to the models of the Gustavian period. The central administration was created on the top of the old Swedish local and provincial administration. The Emperor had pledged to maintain the Lutheran faith in Finland, the existing rights and laws and the privileges of the estates, and relying on these undertakings the Finns proceeded to steer their way into the future.¹⁸

In Sweden, the main problem was how to re-establish the legitimacy of the government. As mentioned above, Gustavus IV Adolphus was deposed in March 1809, and thereafter the new rulers missed no occasion to emphasize his responsibility for the disastrous outcome of the war. These allegations were for a long time echoed not only by the king’s enemies, but also by other contemporaries in Sweden and Finland, as well as by historians. Consequently, the deposed king was

condemned as a kind of ‘war criminal’, and this was used to legitimate the changes that were implemented.¹⁹

Among the immediate consequences of the war were the changes made in the politics of different parts of the old realm after 1809. The Peace Treaty of Fredrikshamn sealed the fact that there were two different systems of government on the western and eastern sides of the Gulf of Bothnia. At the Diet of 1809 in Stockholm, a new Instrument of Government was enacted, repealing the constitutional laws of the Gustavian period. By contrast, although the Gustavian constitutional laws were not directly adopted at the Diet of Porvoo in Finland, which was held about the same time, in practice the new autonomous Grand Duchy willingly maintained and adhered to them to the letter.

To overstate the case slightly, the Diet of Stockholm in 1809 forcefully argued in favour of *change*, whereas in Porvoo the authorities fought tooth and nail to maintain the *old Gustavian order*. In Sweden, the new authorities used the political concepts of the monarchs of the Gustavian era, but gave them new meanings intended to legitimate the ‘new order’ and the power-seeking ambitions of its representatives. Especially interesting are the discourses employed during the enacting of the new Instrument of Government at the Diet held in the spring and early summer of 1809: the term ‘subject’ (*undersåtare*) was scarcely used, its place being taken by ‘citizen’ (*medborgare*) in roughly the same sense as it is understood today. The difference from the debates in Porvoo is considerable; there the authorities strictly refrained from using the word ‘citizen’ in its present sense. The discourse of ‘subject’ and other equivalent terms continued to be employed for a long time during the era of the Grand Duchy. The comparison with contemporary discussions held in Sweden, in what was in principle an equivalent forum of state legislation, reveals an interesting contrast in the approaches of the two countries to the same crisis.²⁰

The reformulation of key political concepts—or, correspondingly, keeping them exactly the same—was connected in general to the problem of legitimacy faced by the state and its ruler around 1809. The problem was much more serious on the Swedish side, since a coup carried out by the country’s own forces was something quite different from occupation by an alien army, as was the case in Finland. In Sweden, the coup in March 1809 had been a completely bloodless one. However, a coup is always a sensitive issue, irrespective of how ‘just’ or ‘right’ its causes may be. This explains the rather different tactics employed at the same time by the like-minded leaders of the ‘new Sweden’ and the ‘new Finland’ in order to re-establish and maintain the legitimacy of their respective state administrations. In Sweden, the leaders argued for *change*, while in Finland they sought to preserve *the old system*.²¹

The Peace Treaty of Fredrikshamn was the bottom-line for Sweden. In Finland, the situation was easier, for it seems that there were far fewer concrete problems there. One point of comparison is the treatment of the old power elites in the 'new Sweden' and the 'new Finland'. In Finland, the so-called Gustavian group—members of the elite gathered around Gustavus III—constituted the operative leadership of the country during the process of building the new state. In Sweden, the Gustavians were determinedly removed or otherwise deprived of power. This juncture is referred to in Sweden as the conflict between the old Gustavians and 'the men of 1809'.²²

The extent and gravity of the problems in Sweden are well illustrated by the fate of the man who was the second in rank after the king himself, Marshal of the Realm Axel von Fersen the Younger. He was killed in the streets of Stockholm about a year after the institution of the new form of government. Fersen's fate, together with the reactions of the soldiers who quite calmly watched him being killed, shows in its own way how the pacification of society took place. In Stockholm, it had long been customary to put down all sorts of unrest peacefully and without the use of the military. Thus what happened in the summer of 1810 in the capital was no exception to this convention. Naturally, this state of affairs was no consolation to the deceased marshal. At the same time, the lynching can be seen as the punishment of a 'war criminal' or 'war perpetrator', in much the same way Gustavus IV Adolphus was regarded as the culprit of the dissolution of the Swedish realm.²³ In Finland, conversely, the men who had been accused of cowardice for abandoning the fortresses of Sveaborg and Svartholm during the war were extremely unpopular after 1809, but they were not physically threatened. Nevertheless, the loss of honour of these officers and nobles meant that, in terms of social standing, they were to all extents and purposes dead.

After the restoration of peace, Sweden was restless for a long time. The Diet of 1810, for instance, was removed from Stockholm to Örebro in central Sweden. The following year, the peasants of Scania rebelled in protest against enlistment, but the uprising was ruthlessly put down.²⁴ In Finland, huge efforts were required in order to establish and develop a new administration. In this respect, the infrastructure was built on far less stable ground than in Sweden, albeit on quite a different level from that of 'under-governed' Russia. Certainly there were problems during the period of transition in Finland, too, not least of which was the integration of 'Old Finland' into the 'new Finland' soon after the peace treaty. The point here, as Max Engman has emphasized, is that territories which Russia had previously taken from 'Swedish Finland' were now restored to Finland, not the other way round.²⁵

The loss of Finland caused a crisis in Sweden. Immediately after the war, revanchism flared up, and there was a strong desire to get Finland back. These illusions evaporated, however, very soon after Napoleon's former marshal, Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, was elected heir to the throne of Sweden in August 1810. When Bernadotte took power as crown prince, Sweden began to make approaches to Russia, and Finland, which according to the shrewd analysis of the crown prince was very difficult to defend, was removed from the strategic calculations of Sweden. In fact, Finland almost disappeared from public debate. Moreover, academics—professors of history in the forefront—aimed at erasing the eastern side of the Gulf of Bothnia from Swedish history and replacing it with Norway when Sweden and Norway formed a personal union in 1814.²⁶

In any case, both Sweden and Finland survived with relatively little damage; indeed, they emerged extremely well from a war which had ended in crushing defeat. This claim can be concretised by using Finland as an example: one can ask how many readers know of a region, country or state which suffered a crushing defeat in war, the forces of which surrendered, which was separated from its old mother state, which was occupied and subdued under foreign rule, but in which a functioning central administration was built almost from nothing by the nation's own hands within a couple of years, and which proved able to administer almost all of its own affairs? In pondering the answer, one should remember that the role of the Russian army is noteworthy because—unlike many other invaders and occupiers in later wars—it did not have to commit large forces to pacifying the country. It also showed the Russians' pragmatic attitude to organizing the administration in Finland because there the Russian state conglomeration was spared the kind of problems which haunted it in various other parts of the empire.²⁷

The most significant outcome of the Peace Treaty of Fredrikshamn was that it brought peace to the Nordic region. Sweden has enjoyed peace for almost two-hundred years. In Finland, a state of peace prevailed after 1809 almost without interruption for over one-hundred years, and again more recently over the last sixty years. Thus the long-term effects of the peace treaty have been significant.

Notes

1. See for instance Max Engman, *Pitkät jäähyväiset: Suomi Ruotsin ja Venäjän välissä vuoden 1809 jälkeen* (Juva, 2009), also in Swedish: *Ett långt farväl: Finland mellan Sverige och Ryssland efter 1809* (Stockholm, 2009).

2. Previous research on the Russo-Swedish War of 1808–1809 includes Martin Hårdstedt, *Finska kriget* (Stockholm, 2006), also in Finnish: *Suomen sota 1808–1809* (Juva, 2007); Jussi T. Lappalainen, Lars Ericson Wolke & Ali Pylkkänen, *Sota Suomesta: Suomen sota 1808–1809* (Hämeenlinna, 2007); Jussi T. Lappalainen, Lars Ericson Wolke & Ali Pylkkänen, *Suomen sodan historia* (Hämeenlinna, 2008). See also Nils Erik Villstrand, *Riksdelen: stormakt och riksprängning 1560–1812*. *Finlands svenska historia 2* (Jyväskylä, 2009), p. 265–278.
3. The classic accounts of the Peace Treaty of Fredrikshamn are Erik Hamnström, *Freden i Fredrikshamn* (Uppsala, 1902); Sam Clason, *Gustaf IV Adolf och den europeiska krisen under Napoleon* (Stockholm, 1913); Anders Grade, *Sverige och Tilsit-alliansen (1807–1810)* (Lund, 1913); Sten Carlsson has summarized the previous research and combined it with his own research on Gustavus IV Adolphus: (see his ‘1792–1810’, *Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia. III: 1* (Stockholm, 1954). The Russian point of view is analysed by Jyrki Paakoski, ‘Venäjän keisarikunta ja Suomen suuriruhtinaskunnan synty 1808–1820’, in *Venäjän keisarikunta ja Suomen suuriruhtinaskunnan synty 1808–1820: Det ryska kejsardömet och tillkomsten av storfurstendömet i Finland 1808–1820* (s. l., s. a. [2008]), p. 42–46 (texts also in Swedish and Russian). Matti Klinge writes in a wider international context: see for instance his *Napoleonin varjo: Euroopan ja Suomen murros 1795–1815* (Keuruu, 2009), also in Swedish: *Napoleons skugga: baler, bataljer och Finlands tillkomst* (Helsingfors, 2009). See also Engman 2009, p. 66–67, 76–77, 142–143, and Jan Samuelson, *Eliter, riket och riksdelningen: sociala nätverk och geografiska mobilitet mellan Sverige och Finland 1720–1820*, SLS 705 (Helsingfors, 2008); Villstrand 2009, p. 297–301.
4. Hamnström 1902, p. 83–84, 87, 91; Clason 1913, p. 167–168, 171, 188, 198–224; Hårdstedt 2006, p. 374; Kari Tarkiainen, ‘Luonnollisten rajojen oppi ja David Alopauksen osuus Suomen suuriruhtinaskunnan rajojen synnyssä’, in *Historiallinen Aikakauskirja* 2009: 4, p. 285.
5. See for instance Mikael Alm, ‘Dynasty in the Making: A New King and His “Old” Men in Royal Ceremonies 1810–1844’, in *Scripts of Kingship: Essays on Bernadotte and Dynastic Formation in an Age of Revolution*, eds. Mikael Alm & Britt-Inger Johansson (Uppsala, 2008), p. 27–29.
6. Engman 2009, p. 80; Tarkiainen 2009, p. 292.
7. These ore deposits have been known at least since the 1770s, when a prominent Swedish geographer Eric Tuneld wrote about them in his *Geographie öfver konungariket Sverige samt därunder hörande länder I–III*, 7th ed. (Stockholm, 1793–1795), p. 228–229 (On line: http://rarapdf.ub.umu.se/pdf_books/900571_3.pdf, 28.12.2009); Hamnström 1902, p. 94; Tarkiainen 2009, p. 388–391.
8. On the various problems along the new frontier between Sweden and Russia, see for instance Eric Anthoni, ‘De västerbottniska områdenas förening med Finland’, in *Historisk Tidskrift för Finland* 1922; Engman 2009, p. 112. See also Maria Lähteenmäki, *The Peoples of Lapland: Boundary, Demarcations and Interaction in the North Calotte from 1808 to 1889* (Helsinki, 2006). On the short- and long-term effects of the Peace of Fredrikshamn in the North Calotte region see also the collection of articles *Fredens konsekvenser: sambällsförändringar i norr*

efter 1809, eds. Lars Elenius, Patrik Lantto & Matti Enbuske (Luleå, 2009), in particular the articles of Ritva Kylli, '1809 års gräns och dess inverkan på samerna', p. 153–160, and Martin Hårdstedt, 'De militärpolitiska konsekvenserna av freden 1809', p. 208–209; Tarkiainen 2009, p. 393–394.

9. Cf. the situation after the Great Northern War, on which see Petri Karonen, 'The Council of the Realm and the Quest for Peace in Sweden, 1718–1721', in *Hopes and Fears for the Future in Early Modern Sweden, 1500–1800*, ed. Petri Karonen (Tampere, 2009), p. 286–287.

10. See for instance Clason 1913, p. 209–210.

11. Fredrikshamn Peace Treaty, September 17, 1809. On line: <http://libris.kb.se/bib/11314550> (28.12.2009).

12. For examples of the economic relations between the Finns and the Swedes after 1809, see for instance Paavo Korpisaari, *Suomen ulkomaankaupasta vuosina 1812–25: Kauppahistoriallinen tutkimus* (Kotka, 1911); Kauko E. Joustela, *Suomen Venäjän-kauppa autonomian ajan alkupuoliskolla vv. 1809–1865*, *Historiallisia Tutkimuksia LXII* (Lahti, 1963), p. 32–33, 48–50, 72–75; Engman 2009, p. 149–150; Jouni Yrjänä, *Metsäpirulainen: Liikemies Erik Johan Längman (1799–1863) talousjärjestelmän murroksessa* (Helsinki, 2009). On line: (<https://oa.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/46800/metsapir.pdf?sequence=1>).

13. There is lot of literature dealing with the status and place of Finland during the period from the fifteenth to the early nineteenth centuries. See for instance Petri Karonen, *Pohjoinen suurvalta: Ruotsi ja Suomi 1521–1809* (Juva, 2008); Petri Karonen, 'De finska borgarna och begreppet "Finland": om borgarståndet och dess krav på ständertidens riksdagar', in *Maktens mosaik: enhet, särart och självbild i det svenska riket*, eds. Max Engman & Nils Erik Villstrand (Helsingfors & Stockholm, 2008), p. 265–283, 464–472, and the literature mentioned therein. An interesting early analysis is Carl von Bonsdorff's 'Finlands inträde i ryska riket', in *Finsk tidskrift* 1922, p. 329–335. Cf. for instance Kari Tarkiainen, 'Hjärtat eller magen? Reaktionen efter riksdelningen', in *Stormvindar: en bok om ödesåret 1809*, ed. Ingvar von Malmborg, Årsbok för Riksarkivet och Landsarkiven 2009 (Växjö, 2009), p. 253–254; Klinge 2009, p. 205, 289, 290; Engman 2009, p. 20–22, 24–25, 162–163; Villstrand 2009, p. 299; Torkel Jansson, *Rikssprängningen som kom av sig: finsk-svenska gemenskaper efter 1809* (Malmö, 2009), p. 59, 337.

14. '[B]ör Ni förstå, att det gäller kejsarens ära att ej fordra en bit af Sverige. Det är nog, att Ni har tagit Finland', Hamnström 1902, p. 104; Tarkiainen 2009, p. 393.

15. Joh. Rich. Danielson, *Suomen yhdistäminen Venäjän valtakuntaan. K. Ordinin "Suomen valloitus" nimisen teoksen johdosta* (Porvoo, 1890), p. 177–179 (also in Swedish, Russian and French); Hamnström 1902, p. 104–105. On the ceremonies in Porvoo, see Henrika Tandefelt, *Borgå 1809: ceremoni och fest* (Tavastehus, 2009), also in Finnish: *Porvoo 1809: jublamenoja ja tanssiaisia* (Helsinki, 2009). The Russian pacification policy in Finland has been analysed frequently during the last few decades; see especially Aimo Halila, 'Porvoon valtiopäivät ja autonomian alkuaika', in *Suomen kansanedustuslaitoksen historia*, part 1 (Hel-

sinki, 1962); Osmo Jussila, *Suomen suuriruhtinaskunta 1809–1917* (Porvoo, 2004); Päiviö Tommila, *Suomen autonomian synty 1808–1819* (Helsinki, 2008), also in Swedish: *Det autonoma Finlands födelse 1808–1819* (Helsingfors, 2009); Lars Gabriel von Bonsdorff, *Den ryska pacificeringen i Finland, 1808–09* (Helsingfors, 1929); Nils Erik Villstrand, 'Från konungens undersåtar till kejsarens: Den ryska tro- och huldhetseden i Vasa län år 1808', in *Krig kring Kvarken: Finska kriget 1808–09 och slaget vid Oravais i ny belysning*, eds. Martin Hårdstedt & Göran Backman (Oravais, 1999); Nils Erik Villstrand, *Landet annorlunda: uppsatser om Österbottens historia* (Vasa, 2002); Villstrand 2009, p. 278–297. See also Petri Karonen, 'Introduction: Sweden, Russia and Finland 1808–1809', in *Monetary boundaries in Transition: A North European Economic History and the Finnish War 1808–1809*, eds. Cecilia von Heijne & Tuukka Talvio (Huskvarna, 2010), p. 9–19.

16. J. R. Danielson-Kalmari, *Suomen valtio- ja yhteiskuntaelämää 18:nnellä ja 19:nnellä vuosisadalla. Aleksanteri I:n aika. Ensimmäinen osa* (Porvoo, 1920), p. 89; Joustela 1963, p. 48, 61, 75; Antti Kuusterä, 'Valtio, talous ja valtionalous', in *Talous, valta, valtio: Tutkimuksia 1800-luvun Suomesta*, ed. Pertti Haapala (Helsinki, 1990), p. 63–64, 67, 69, 72–73; Timo Myllyntaus, 'Suomen talouspolitiikka ja valtionalous 1809–1860', in *Suomen taloushistoria 1: Agraarinen Suomi*, eds. Eino Jutikkala, Yrjö Kaukiainen & Sven-Erik Åström (Helsinki, 1980), p. 340–341, 347–348.

17. Cf. Petri Karonen, 'Coping with Peace after a Debacle: the Crisis of the Transition to Peace in Sweden after the Great Northern War (1700–1721)', in *Scandinavian Journal of History* 2008: 3, p. 204–205, 208–217. For a general discussion of the problematics of returning to peace analogically considered in the light of the twentieth-century situation, see *Kun sota on obi: sodista selviytymisen ongelmia ja niiden ratkaisumalleja 1900-luvulla*, Historiallinen Arkisto 124, eds. Petri Karonen & Kerttu Tarjamo (Helsinki, 2006) (Summary in English: When the war is over. Management of the aftermath of wars and models of solving post war challenges in the 20th century).

18. On the use of Swedish law in Finland after 1809, see for instance Jansson, *Rikssprängningen som kom av sig* (Malmö, 2009), chapter I, p. 330, 332.

19. On Gustavus IV Adolphus as a 'war perpetrator', see for instance Anders Sundin, 'Historia som politiskt vapen – att skapa ett nytt minne', in *Stormvindar*, p. 28–29; Carl Michael Raab, 'Det lossade samfundsbandet: Gustav IV Adolfs tid som fånge på Grips-holm', in *Stormvindar*, p. 70. See also Åke Sandström, 'Sverige 1809–1864', in *Det nya Norden efter Napoleon*, eds. Max Engman & Åke Sandström (Stockholm, 2004), p. 122. A historiographical overview of the problematics is given by Åke Sandström in 'Sveriges 1809: föreställningar om finska kriget under 200 år', in *Fänrikens marknadsminne: Finska kriget 1808–1809 och dess följder i eftervärldens ögon*, ed. Max Engman (Jyväskylä, 2009), p. 28–29, 45–46, 49, 52–54, 95.

20. On discussions of the 'subject–citizen' discourse, see for instance Charlotta Wolff, *Noble conceptions of politics in eighteenth-century Sweden (ca 1740–1790)* (Helsinki, 2008), chapter 3; Anders Sundin, *1809: statskuppen och regeringsformens tillkomst som tolkningsprocess* (Upp-

sala, 2006); Karonen 2008, p. 434–436; Pasi Ihalainen & Anders Sundin, 'The Swedish Riksdag and the Modernisation of Political Discourse, 1769–1818' (manuscript, forthcoming in 2011).

21. Karonen 2008, p. 435–436; Mats Berglund, *Massans röst: upplopp och gatubråk i Stockholm 1719–1848* (Stockholm, 2009), p. 252; Mats Hemström, *Marschen mot makten: västra arméns revolt och väg till Stockholm 1809* (Stockholm, 2005).

22. However, Mikael Alm has shown that many members of the Gustavian elite were also in power during the reign of King Charles XIV John. See Alm 2008, p. 31–36, 47.

23. Mats Berglund, 'Varför måste Fersen dö? Om mordet på Axel von Fersen den 20 juni 1810', in *Stormvindar*; Sundin 2006; Sundin 2009; Berglund 2009, p. 257–310.

24. Peter Ullgren, 'Så måste vi alla stupa utan nytta: bondemassakern i Klågerup 1811', in *Stormvindar*, p. 100, 102.

25. E. Nevanlinna, 'Suomen ja Venäjän välinen sotilaskorvauskysymys sata vuotta sitten: Historiallinen esitys erään venäläisen väitteen johdosta I–II', in *Aika* 1910, p. 721–733, 802–17; Raimo Savolainen (ed.), *Suomen keskusballinnon historia 1809–1996* (Helsinki, 1996); Paaskoski 2008; Engman 2009, p. 114–115; Tarkiainen 2009, p. 397–400.

26. Sandström 2004, p. 127, 131–132, Henrik Edgren, 'Nationell katastrof, glömska eller ointresse? Finland i Sverige efter rikssprängningen', in *Stormvindar*, p. 303, 307, 310; Villstrand 2009, p. 317–320.

27. On this see Petri Karonen, 'Vad vet vi i dag om året 1809?', in *Tidskriften Skärgård* 3/2007 (See also http://www.1809info.net/pdfs/pdf_20_1; http://www.1809info.net/pdfs/pdf_20_2) (28.12.2009).

Summary:

The Peace Treaty of Fredrikshamn and its Aftermath in Sweden and Finland

This article analyses the Peace Treaty of Fredrikshamn (Hamina in Finnish) and its consequences in Sweden and Finland. The Russians set strict preconditions for the commencement of peace negotiations with the Swedes in the summer of 1809. These conditions were realized almost *in toto* in the final peace treaty, which consisted of just twenty-one articles. In addition to regulations directly related to the ending of hostilities, the main provisions of the agreement entailed huge territorial losses for Sweden, strictly defining the regions it was to cede to Russia, the most important of which was Finland. Sweden was also enjoined to give up its alliance with Britain and to join the Continental Blockade. Furthermore, the peace treaty laid down provisions for securing the position of both Finns and Swedes as subjects in the new situation, defined measures to ensure the continued functioning of the economy, and stipulated strict provi-

sions for the protection of private property. The latter were very significant, especially with regard to the legitimacy of the administration, the pacification of society, and the safeguarding of the infrastructures in both Finland and Sweden. The post-war resumption of peace was not easy for either the Finns or the Swedes. However, the problems caused by the peace treaty were very different on the two sides of the Gulf of Bothnia. The problems in Finland were easier to solve because they were more concrete. The Grand Duchy of Finland, which was born out of the treaty, was permitted to maintain the existing Swedish legislative, social and local administrative framework, and a new central governmental machinery was created on top of it. In Sweden, the most important problems attending the return to peace (which could also be described as a 'crisis of peace') included the difficult question of the succession along with serious internal and economic issues. However, the most serious worry concerned the re-establishment and maintenance of the legitimacy of the government in the new situation.

Keywords: post-war society, Sweden, Russia, Finland, Aftermath of the Finnish War, Peace Treaty of Fredrikshamn.