

hushåll som förestods av kvinnor bland mottagarna av flyktinghjälpen.

Slutligen behandlas också flyktingarnas återvändande till Finland och de problem som kunde uppstå därvid.

En mer generell anmärkning på avhandlingen är att de mycket breda frågorna inte är förankrade i något teoretiskt förhållningssätt. Bristen på teoretisk styrning blir särskilt tydlig i metoden. De sociala kategorier som utgör grunden för diskussionerna om vilka flyktingarna var, är med en mindre justering övertagna från Sten Carlssons klassiska, men nu mer än sextio år gamla studie *Ståndssambälle och ståndspersoner*. En mer avgränsad frågeställning hade gjort det tydligare varför författaren har valt just dessa kategorier. Ett sådant tillvägagångssätt hade också gjort det möjligt för författaren att dra mer generella slutsatser av sitt arbete.

Sammantaget är detta en mycket användbar avhandling som behandlar ett angeläget och förbisett ämne. Undersökningens resultat går att vidareutveckla och kommer säkerligen att generera nya frågor och vidare forskning.

Peter Ericsson

Karl Axelsson, *The Sublime: Precursors and British Eighteenth-Century Conceptions*, (Oxford etc.: Peter Lang, 2007). 235 pp.

The eighteenth-century interest in the sublime is a fascinating field which has attracted rather lavish attention, but which certainly deserves much more attention still. Samuel Monk's influential work *The Sublime: a Study of Critical Theories in XVIII-Century England* from 1935 has been supplemented and questioned in several respects; the discussions of the sublime have shifted focus between the source text *Peri Hupsous*, the eighteenth-century adaptations and the sublime as an aesthetic phenomenon pertaining to present-day discussions. A fruitful path was indicated by Peter de Bolla, who in *The Discourse of the Sublime: Readings in History, Aesthetics and the Subject* (1989) connected the aesthetic interest in the sublime with the formation of the subject in eighteenth-century England. This path of contextualising the sublime, or rather the interest in the sublime, has now been joined by Karl Axelsson with his thesis *The Sublime: Precursors and British Eighteenth-Century Conceptions*. In 1972, Theodore Wood adjusted Monk's

image by following the word *sublime* in its different contexts before fascination in the sublime peaked around the middle of the eighteenth century. Axelsson instead stresses the close connection between the sublime and the imagination, and follows the early discussions of the imagination in order to contextualise and clarify the great interest in the sublime.

The study is divided into three parts. The first is devoted to an examination of Samuel Monk's image of the sublime. Monk's influence on our view of the sublime in eighteenth-century Britain has been considerable to say the least. Axelsson collects the criticism which has been directed toward Monk and formulates his own. He describes the strong consensus regarding a 'turning point' of the sublime, that Boileau's translation and preface in 1674 awoke a fascination in the sublime which would reach a climax toward the end of the 1730s. Without denying that Boileau was important for the impact of the sublime, Axelsson wishes to point out an alternative perspective. The description of a 'turning point' is correct if delimited to the sublime as a concept, but not if one examines the arguments surrounding it, he claims. On the one hand, Monk posited a development of the ideas of the sublime which was to culminate in Kant's *Critique of Judgment* in 1790; on the other hand this development was created by opposing it to neo-classicist traits. As is shown, Monk himself rejected a simplified description of neo-classicism as rigid pedantry, but Axelsson finds that Monk cannot uphold the ambition as he regards Longinus as the 'patron saint of much that is unclassical and un-neoclassical, and eventually of much that is romantic, in eighteenth-century England' (p. 40).

As de Bolla and Andrew Ashfield stated in their introduction to *The Sublime: a Reader in British Eighteenth-Century Aesthetic Theory* (1996), the appearance of the sublime – that is, regardless of the terms used – should be understood in connection with the epistemological change where theology ceased to offer a governing model of understanding and when aesthetics came to serve as a means for defining a new subject (p. 47). Axelsson chooses to focus on a different material, letting go of the focus on the word *sublime* itself. Instead, 'the arguments that shaped the experience of the sublime of Longinus as well as of the sublime of the eighteenth-century criticism' are to be explored by applying a new perspective on Longinus and approaching a new material, namely the 'criticism of intellectual literature', by which Axelsson means a particular scientific discussion.

Part II offers an examination of ‘the arguments that structured the experience of the sublime’ according to Longinus. It commences with an illustrative survey of how confusing the argument of *Peri Hupsous* has been found – the ambiguities of Longinus certainly have added to the attraction of the treatise throughout history, and play a great part in the propositions of Boileau and Pope that Longinus himself is sublime while speaking of the sublime. In essence this part is devoted to a ‘close reading’ of the treatise, interspersed with eighteenth-century comments. The *Peri Hupsous* is analysed as it appears in William Smith’s influential translation, first printed in 1739.

In the chapter ‘Transgression’, Longinus’ description of authors he considers sublime, such as Plato and Demosthenes, is considered. Their sublime is of a different nature, and Axelsson summarizes the paradoxical Longinian sublime as framed by the three categories bombast, puerility and *parentbursos*, ‘ill-timed Emotion’ in Smith’s words, or rather ‘false affectation’. Axelsson is able to draw much evidence from Longinus’ discussion of why Hyperides is superior to Demosthenes in all parts, but still is inferior when it comes to achieving the sublime. It is also here that the well-known dictum that the sublime is not achieved by flawlessness, turns up. Instead, the risk-taking becomes apparent: the sublime verges on exaggeration of various sorts, and Axelsson can conclude that it even seems that flaw in itself may be taken as a sign of the sublime: the power of inspiration makes technical completion impossible. This is also the place for a discussion of that dynamic *mimesis* which Longinus propounds, constituting a way of achieving sublimity through the creative inspiration of great authors. Referring to Jean-François Lyotard’s description that Longinus teaches rhetorical devices for persuading and moving, not for perpetuating the teaching but rather for destabilizing the didactic intention, Axelsson defines a manner of *transgression*: since there cannot be a set of firm rules, each new achievement of the sublime – for example through *mimesis* – must be a ‘transgression of a former definition’ (p. 81).

A chapter called ‘The Expediency of Plato’ is devoted to the importance of Plato in *Peri Hupsous*. Longinus describes how a cultural decline has taken place because greed and interest in pleasures have made the soul lose sight of the sublime. Axelsson here discusses how Longinus quotes Plato’s *Republic* in order to elaborate the image of how the author, especially in a time of decline, must fix his eyes on the non-worldly, non-material world. The chapter sets out with a critique of

Russell’s idea that Longinus’ ideal is a Stoic one, and that Plato had become influential to the Stoics. Axelsson questions the grounds for arguing that Longinus approved of Plato’s arguments as such (p. 97), but agrees with Russell’s description of how Longinus connects stylistic ideals to a moral ideal (p. 102) and in effect demonstrates how the Platonic absolute provides an image of the sublime as a necessity, arisen in genuine intentions and integrity, leading to that transgression which is its definition.

The third chapter of part two is devoted to the imagination. Axelsson underlines the fact that the issue of imagination is highly important in *Peri Hupsous* not to say in its reception. The power of imagination is important not least since the first two sources of the sublime, which Longinus describes as congenital, can be understood in terms of imagination, and Axelsson focusses on the description of *phantasia* in the fifteenth chapter. He states that ‘An image is an idea, while the imagination is »warm’d and affected« when presenting this idea, according to Longinus’. Longinus in Smith’s translation distinguishes between a general sense of image as ‘any Idea however represented in the Mind’, and the one which Longinus himself prefers: ‘When the Imagination is so warm’d and affected, that you seem to behold yourself the very things you are describing, and to display them to the life before the Eyes of an Audience’ (p. 108–109). This exercise of the imagination is, according to Axelsson, central to the sublime in *Peri Hupsous*, and it is this imagination he will be tracing in the third part of the dissertation.

Part III of the thesis first treats the notions of the creative power of imagination and the connections between its images and the sublime in the criticism of poetry. Axelsson points out that although critics did not agree on or discuss all details of the imagination, the common denominator is the power of imagination and the experience of the sublime. Addison’s famous discussions of the imagination in *The Spectator* 1712 are treated together with a number of more or less renowned adaptations of the sublime and imagination. The discussion contains several distinctly illuminating observations, clarifying the reception of the Longinian sublime both before and after the publication of Smith’s translation in 1739. The idea of the power of the imagination was varied in different ways, but the appreciation of it is a constant in the material treated. Axelsson points to the fact that several critics speak of the exercise of imagination as a kind of enlargement of the mind, necessary in order to comprise the vastness

of the sublime. Extraordinary effort was connected to the imaginative act: the mind must be expanded in order to seize the almost unfathomable, and the effort was demanded not only of the creator but also of the receiver. After having established the notions of these critics of the sublime, Axelsson is ready to present the context which Monk did not actualize and which constituted a foundation of the interest in the imagination without connecting it to the sublime: the 'criticism of intellectual literature' during the second half of the seventeenth century.

The seventeenth-century discussion of imagination, which departed from a suspicion of the imagination as something which leads reason astray, has not previously been discussed in connection with the eighteenth-century fascination in the sublime. Within the criticism of intellectual literature connected with the Royal Society, the ambition was to define standards for exact scientific collection, examination and discourse. Opposing the description that the Royal Society critics called imagination into question simply in order to advance a straight, unadorned language which would not obscure the objects of knowledge, Brian Vickers has claimed that the critique of imagination was part of a political stratagem, aimed at conquering the 'so called Nonconformists or Enthusiasts' by tying them to dangerous imagination, while science and church could join forces with reason. Thus, much of the critique of imagination should be understood as directed not toward imagination as such, but as directed toward 'the exercise of the undisciplined imagination' (p. 159–61). In consequence, Axelsson points out that such a focus on undisciplined imagination must in fact have strengthened the importance attributed to imagination in regard to poetry. Axelsson can document a corresponding suspicious attention to imagination in the seventeenth century also in authors such as John Dryden and John Locke. Placing imagination in contrast to empiricist ideals, the latter appears to have encouraged the interest in imagination significantly. In the concluding chapter, it is demonstrated how Thomas Hobbes in *Leviathan* (1651) expounded the imagination in such a way as not only to stress its passive reception and unreliability, but also to underline the power of imagination by distinguishing between 'simple' and 'compounded imagination'.

In his thesis, Axelsson thus aims at demonstrating the close connection between the sublime and the imagination in *Peri Hupsous*, and then at clarifying the importance of the tradition of the seventeenth-century

criticism of intellectual literature for the eighteenth-century delight in the sublime. Axelsson's contextualisation of the interest in the sublime connects not least to the work of de Bolla, and certainly is the strong part of the thesis. The discussion in part III of the various attitudes to imagination before the surge of the fascination of the sublime is interesting and relevant, including several illuminating examples (an index would have been useful, though). The weakest part is the 'close reading' of *Peri Hupsous*, in part II.

The elusiveness of the author of *Peri Hupsous* as well as the dating and circumstances of the treatise are efficiently described in the introduction, but in the study, Longinus is generally synonymous with the translation of William Smith or, sometimes, that of Rhys Roberts. The translation of Roberts is used for reference, as being 'the current standard translation' (p. 26). When analysing 'Longinus', Axelsson quotes Smith's translation, regularly giving Roberts' translation in a footnote but only on few occasions commenting on the differences. However, if one were to use a modern translation as representative of Longinus' text, one would have to discuss the differences in the Smith translation thoroughly. One would also have to explain the choice of the Roberts translation from 1899 instead of Donald Russell's revision of W. H. Fyfe's translation (Loeb Classical Library, 1995), Russell himself having published the authoritative edition and having had access to all scholarly advances until then. Above all, if one proposes to say anything about Longinus' argument, one needs to use the Greek text. Instead, Axelsson treats Smith's 1739 translation as if it were the original.

The most apparent consequence surfaces in Axelsson's discussion of Longinus' view on *imagination*. When Axelsson says that 'An image is an idea, while the imagination is »warm'd and affected« when presenting this idea, according to Longinus' (p. 108), it seems as if Longinus distinguishes between imagination and image and thus discusses the mental faculty of imagination and its importance for the creation of images. This is to some extent true of Smith's translation, but it is not true of Longinus. When Smith speaks of a 'warm'd and affected' 'Imagination', there is no imagination in the source text. And when Smith speaks of 'Image', Longinus actually speaks of 'imagination', *phantasia* in the Greek, but to him it is a rhetorical term. It was originally labelled so because of a kind of connection to the imagination, but not in a way which makes it legitimate to interpret it as the mental faculty.

Longinus commences his treatment of this central issue in chapter 15 by clarifying his distinctions in a way obfuscated by Smith (and Roberts) but rather clear in Fyfe/Russell's translation:

Weight, grandeur, and urgency in writing are very largely produced, dear young friend, by the use of 'visualizations' (*phantasiai*). That at least is what I call them; others call them 'image productions.' [*eidolopoiias*] For the term *phantasia* is applied in general to an idea which enters the mind from any source and engenders speech, but the word has now come to be used predominantly of passages where, inspired by strong emotion [*hup' entbousiasmou kai pathous*], you seem to see what you describe and bring it vividly before the eyes of your audience.

Longinus strictly defines his use of *phantasia* as a rhetorical device. This has to do with, but cannot be equated with, the 'exercise of the imagination' which Axelsson discusses. It is Smith who has inserted the mental faculty by rendering 'under enthusiasm and passion' with 'warm'd and affected' 'Imagination'. Longinus only discusses images in the sense of verbal visualizations, and he labels them 'imagination', *phantasiai*. On the same page Smith then speaks of how 'to move and strike the Imagination' and of the poet seeing 'the Furies with the Eyes of his Imagination': in the former case 'imagination' is a kind of interpretation of *pathêtikon* and *sunkekinêmenon*, 'agitated'; in the latter case it renders *epphantasthê*, which means that the poet has 'made visible' that which he communicates to his audience. One must gather that his imagination was engaged in that action, and Smith inserted a warm and agitated imagination and tried to separate it from 'image': this certainly is an interesting aspect of the reception of *Peri Hupsous* but it is so precisely because it is not what Longinus said.

In a foot-note Axelsson explains that Smith's translation is different from that of Roberts, but not even this causes him to consider what the source itself says. This lays the foundation of a consistent misreading of *Peri Hupsous*: that 'exercise of the imagination', which is so important to Axelsson, is difficult to discern, to say the least, in Longinus who does not speak of the mental faculty *phantasia*. Every instance of *phantasia* in Longinus is to be understood in the sense of 'image' or 'visualization', in the same way as the verb *phantazein*, which Longinus uses in the sense 'make visible'. Aristotle and others came to use the word for

the mental faculty of imagination, but even though Longinus stresses imaginative powers in several ways, his *phantasia* should not be misinterpreted. It might have been possible to disregard the original and only to discuss Smith's translation – although it would hardly have been satisfactory in a work on the reception of *Peri Hupsous* – but Axelsson consistently claims to be describing the argument of Longinus, not of Smith.

Longinus certainly speaks of inspiration and such greatness of mind which cannot be learnt by techniques, but when he speaks of *phantasia*, it is the rhetorical term for visualization, a technique which serves the effect usually labelled *enargeia* or *evidentia*. Curiously, Axelsson mentions that Quintilian also discusses this, but refers to the wrong place and draws no conclusions from the fact that Quintilian identifies *phantasia* with *visio*, which leads to *evidentia* (*Institutiones Oratoriae*, 6.2.29–32). This well-known figure has to do with the mental faculty since it employs the imagination both of the speaker/poet and of the audience, but it is the rhetorical device Longinus discusses. To Longinus, this is the figure that more than any effects the sublime, but it still is a figure. As Quintilian proposes, it is highly efficient for exploiting the audiences' emotions – which obviously should be understood in the light of Longinus' accentuation of *pathos*.

Axelsson's interpretation simply disregards the rhetorical foundation of *Peri Hupsous*. Theodore Wood criticized Monk for exaggerating the rhetorical aspect when discussing the Longinian sublime, as Axelsson points out (p. 49). Surely, the highly complex *Peri Hupsous* transgresses the boundaries of rhetorical treatises and it does so in a highly fascinating way, but it is impossible to understand the treatise if one does not take into consideration that it begins in rhetoric. Longinus spoke extensively on the figure *phantasia*, visualization, and this is an important reason why he received so much attention during the eighteenth-century interest in the mental faculty *phantasia*, imagination. *Peri Hupsous* was interpreted as a statement of the importance of the imagination, but this belongs to the history of its reception. Longinus' literary device was understood in the light of the rising aesthetics and that technique certainly is highly conspicuous in the poetry of the time. The rhetorical foundation of *phantasia* found in *Peri Hupsous* is apparent from Quintilian, and is easily found by checking *phantasia* or *imaginatio* in Heinrich Lausberg's *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik*.

Despite this misunderstanding, Axelsson is more right than he knows when he stresses the importance of

*phantasia* in *Peri Hupsous*. Longinus thinks so highly of the figure that he lifts it out from its place among the other rhetorical devices and treats it extensively directly after his general discussion of the sublime. What is more, he does not restrict himself to launching the figure explicitly, he does so implicitly as well. Practically every example in the general, introductory discussion of the sublime includes visualization, so even when *phantasia* is not the topic it is heavily pushed forward. That is, Longinus launches the figure also when his discussion concerns such grand expressions that cannot be learnt through rhetoric's rules. If one wishes to claim that *phantasia/imagination* is of the essence in *Peri Hupsous*, as Axelsson does, these aspects are necessary to take into consideration. In fact, this has already been done in an article 'On the Technique of the Sublime' (*Comparative Literature* 52:1, 2000), which seems to have escaped Axelsson's attention. Awkward as it is to say, it was written by this reviewer.

'By establishing the concentrated exercise of the imagination as a distinctive feature of the experience of the sublime, Longinus left an enduring imprint on criticism', Axelsson states (p. 125). The *phantasia* of which Longinus speaks is not the mental faculty, but the statement is rather correct insofar as his stylistic device *phantasia* – as well as his statements on the sublime in general – was interpreted in a way determined by the arising interest in the mental faculty *phantasia*. The association of the sublime and the interest in the imagination is a productive manoeuvre. Axelsson's treatment of the eighteenth-century discussions of the sublime offers interesting observations, and his connecting the fascination in the sublime with the seventeenth-century considerations of the relation between reason and imagination is illuminating. The thesis thus fills out a valuable aspect of our understanding of the aesthetics of the sublime.

Mats Malm

Robert Callergård, *An Essay on Thomas Reid's Philosophy of Science*, Stockholm Studies in Philosophy 28 (Stockholm: Acta universitatis Stockholmiensis, 2006). 164 s.

Den skotske filosofen Thomas Reid (1710–1796) är framför allt känd som den främste representanten för den så kallade common sense-skolan eller common

sense-filosofin. Den kan i korthet beskrivas som en reaktion mot den kunskapsteoretiska diskussion som tog sin början med Locke, utvecklades av Berkeley och fördes till sin spets av Hume. Denna hade successivt utvecklats i en allt mer skepticistisk riktning. Reids svar var att sätta det sunda förnuftet som måttstock för de filosofiska resonemangens giltighet (filosofer har ju som bekant en tendens att göra tvärtom). Där Hume menade att vi i strikt filosofisk mening inte kan ha någon verklig kunskap om världen utanför oss själva, utan endast om våra egna idéer, menade Reid i stället att detta resonemang är bristfälligt eftersom dess absurditet bevisas för oss dagligen och stundligen i vår praktiska erfarenhet. Oavsett vad filosoferna säger, så vet vi alla att det vi uppfattar med våra sinnen direkt motsvaras av ting i världen, menade Reid.

I en avhandling framlagd vid filosofiska institutionen vid Stockholms universitet 2006 behandlar Robert Callergård en mindre uppmärksam, men ändå central del av Reids filosofi. Reid var nämligen mycket intresserad av naturvetenskap och vetenskapsteori. Dessa ämnesområden har av naturliga skäl också en stark koppling till hans kunskapsteoretiska uppfattning.

Det finns sedan tidigare en klassisk bild av vetenskapsfilosofen Reid: han var den som förde vidare Newtons metodologi till senare generationer brittiska vetenskapsmän och filosofer – empiristerna hade ju inte gjort det eftersom de inte delade Newtons kunskapsteoretiska grund. Reid däremot anses vanligen vara den store newtonianen i generationen direkt efter Newton själv. I centrum för Callergårds studie står därför Reids förhållande till Newton och hans uppfattningar om fysiken som en självständig vetenskaplig disciplin, åtskild från metafysik och teologi.

Reid var mycket medveten om att han levde i perioden som följde direkt på den naturvetenskapliga revolutionen. Han uppfattade sin mästare Newton som fullbordaren av en omvälvning som äntligen lade en fast grund för vetenskapen och gjorde slut på alla stridigheter (han tycks därtill ha uppfattat detta grundläggande som slutgiltigt). Det faktum att Newton lagt en god grund för sitt verk var också förklaringen till att han blev så framgångsrik – enligt Reid var det nämligen just sådana korrekta grundantaganden, principer, definitioner och begrepp som all god vetenskap baserades på. I naturvetenskapen, som är empirisk, var det metoden han ansåg vara det avgörande. Matematikens och naturvetenskapens grundläggande principer, så som de formulerats av Newton, var enligt Reids uppfattning