

## Strength and weakness of the totalitarianism in Wartime Soviet Union

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The Soviet totalitarianism, being rooted in a quite centralized tsarist monarchy had been constructed in the emergency conditions of the Great European and Russian Civil wars. The emergency conditions usually propose strong centralization of the power. Bolsheviki erected such a centralization in an absolute having created the most centralized system ever known to any global civilization or any state in the world history, as not a single political power in the historical perspective managed to gain a total influence over the economy.

Starting from the beginning the Soviet system showed its main features such as strong centralization with its Party substitution of the subordinate organizations, strict total control over all spheres of life of the society from the center. The strengthening of control led to the increase of the State machinery — State bureaucratization.<sup>1</sup> As the majority of the new Soviet bureaucrats were not experienced in state management they had no choice than to apply the military commanding forced methods.

With the above-mentioned main features this strict pyramid of the new power put the individual in a very definite place in this system — to be no more than a small screw in the huge mechanism of the system in order to realize without thinking the main goals of the leaders of this system.

Usually those goals were huge and comprehensive and changed in different historical periods. At the beginning of its existence the system needed to achieve the victory in the Civil war (1917–1920), then — to rehabilitate the economy with the help of the New Economic Policy (NEP, 1920–1926/27), then came «Industrialization», «Collectivization», «Cultural revolution»... All goals of the kind supposed to be achieved with, as they called it, «activity of the peoples' masses».

The Soviet system did not create anything new in choosing the instruments, control levers in order to influence the «activity». But it changed rapidly the accents in the usage of those control levers.

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<sup>1</sup> The amount of bureaucrats in the Soviet Russia grew up as many as 8 times during the period 1917–1920 only.

1. **Factor of fear** («Beria's-Ejov's or Dzerjinsky's syndrome») became the main instrument of influencing the peoples' activity («knout» in the arms of the power holders). This «factor of fear» gives the key to understand the appearance of the GULAG system in the Soviet Russia as an objective feature of the totalitarian state. Together with «the factor of fear» the **ideological factor** («honey-cake») with its huge propaganda machine became another most strong instrument in the arms of the power-holders. (In the economic sphere of life of the society this factor showed itself most vividly in the so-called «socialist competition»). It was a well-known «policy of threats and bribery», but this time — in the hands of the Bolsheviks.
2. **Total drafting of the population into public organizations or different campaigns** arranged by the ruling party were the non-economic methods that forced the population to work in order to achieve the goals of the system.
3. **The scientific and technological factor** was the last control lever in the Party's hands to achieve its goals. In contrast with the European industrial countries this factor ceded in its usage in the Soviet system and was not as important as the two mentioned above.

The 70-year history of the Soviet system showed both its advantages and disadvantages. The undoubted advantage of the system was its ability to mobilize all its resources to solve one main problem, subordinate all efforts of the system in a very short period of time. And it proved very effective in the extreme conditions like Civil war or the Second World War. *But* such a system may effectively function only during a short historical period and shows its non-effectiveness in a peaceful time period, when it needs to solve at the same time a lot of very complicated problems, which are caused by the objective laws of the development of the society and first of all — its economy. These disadvantages led at last to the crushing point of the Soviet state.

After the unsuccessful attempt of the Soviet leadership to export the socialist revolution to Europe at the end of the Civil war, after curtailing of the NEP at the end of the 1920s, the Bolsheviks found out that they were isolated in the whole world. The Soviet leaders had to recognize that their system could survive only with good military protection. They did not abandon but delayed for a while the realization of the idea of the Global revolution.

They needed time to prepare for a new war. Basically the main goal of the Soviet system, which was proclaimed at the end of 1920s till 1939–41, was: «To be ready...

(for the new war»). It was reflected in a very popular slogan of that time: «Bud' gotov k trudu i oborone!» i.e. be always ready to work for and defend the country). All main campaigns, proclaimed by the Communist Party and the Soviet government like Industrialization, Collectivization and Cultural Revolution, were subordinated to this main goal. And a «new course» of the foreign policy of the USSR, which was declared in the early 1930s, was mainly the veiled old course in arranging the preparations for a new war.

Thanks to the totalitarian system's advantages the Soviet state had achieved tremendous results during the 1930s. The industrial production grew 8,5 times during 1929–1940, while the production of primary industry, which was the base of the defense complex of the country, grew more than 10 times (Sovetsky entsiklopedicheski slovar', 1982, 491). After the collectivization in the agriculture the Russian Village with 70% of the total population were put under the Party control. Being under such a control the Russian Village started to deliver both food for the Red Army as well as the urban population and, according to the new passport rules — labor power for the industrial centers. In the Cultural Revolution campaign the majority of the population were taught to read and count (at least it was enough to acquire the party propaganda and master the use of up-to-date machinery). As for the artists or scientists during the Cultural Revolution all of them were consolidated in the so-called «creative unions» i.e. in the system of the total Party propaganda.

The preparations for the new war and building of the most powerful army became the dominant factor of the development of all spheres of the society. It is not by accident that on creating a new structure of the governing of the economy in the Soviet state — GOSPLAN (Gosudarstvennyy Komitet Planirovaniya — State Planning Committee) in 1928 they put the Military Department at the head of it. The staff of this Department totally consisted of the officers of the Red Army. Moreover 40–60% of the state budget of that time — were expenses for the needs of the defense. Approximately half of all employees in the Soviet industry were connected with the military complex as well. Preparations for a war became the dominant issue in the Stalin's propaganda as well. With the aid of mass public organizations, such as Komsomol (Young Communist League), OSOAVIAHIM (Obschestvo sodeistviya oborone, aviatsionnomu i himicheskomu stroitelstvu — a public military organization), Red Cross, sport societies as well as state system of MPVO (Mestnaya protivovozdushnaya oborona — Local AA System) the total population of the USSR

from age 14 to 27 were taught different military professions. At least they were taught to use the rifle or machine gun, or they got to know how to give first aid.

As a result, the Soviet Union had created the most powerful army in the world. In 1938 it had 15,000 tanks, whilst 10 years before — 92 tanks only (Sovetskiye Voorujenniye Sily. Istoriya stroitelstva, 1978, 189). In 1928 the Soviet Air Forces had only 1,400 aircraft. During 1930–1938 the Soviet aircraft industry built up 24,708 planes of different types (*Ibid.* 191–192). At the same time the average annual production of the guns of all types in the USSR increased from 2,540 to 6,130 (*Ibid.* 188). The Soviet Navy had become one of the most powerful in Europe as well. Three new battleships, 4 destroyers («leaders»), 143 submarines (137 of them were built in 1933–1938) were delivered to the Red Fleet in the 1930s (*Ibid.* 193).

The Russian North as part of the new system could not withstand to avoid all those processes, though it has some specific features because of the traditional industrial infrastructure. In the process of modernization the Russian North was allotted the role of the raw materials appendage of the Soviet industry, which would provide the Industrialization with the hard currency received by the state from the sale of timber and cellulose. This hard currency was of great importance for the industrialization process as it allowed to buy the latest machinery and technological equipment from abroad. More than half of all the employees of the Archangel County were involved in timber and cellulose industry. Before the war 10 logging trusts, 56 saw mills and 5 paper mills of Archangel county produced 10% of wooden production, cellulose and paper of the total production of the Russian Federation. Nearly 80% of the total production was produced with the equipment that was built no later than ten years before the war, i.e. with the beginning of the Industrialization campaign. The newspapers often used to refer to the Archangel Province as «valuytni tseh strany» («the hard currency workshop»). In a period of the first two 5-year plans (1928–1938) the Archangel county provided the Industrialization with more than 500 million golden rubles (Ovsyankin, 1965, 95).

Huge territories, river and sea routes which were connected with the global Ocean, put the Russian North into a position of a significant logistic area. During the period of the first two 5-year plans the number of cargo ships of the Northern Marine Shipping and the Arctic Marine Companies doubled (Krasavtsev, 2003, 66). On the eve of the war 57 cargo ships of these two companies provided the transportation of 10% of the total sea cargoes of the USSR.<sup>2</sup> The largest Northern

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<sup>2</sup> RGAE, F.9570 Op.2 D.836 L.8; AAANII, P-2528, p.19; Edlinski, 1965, 28.

River Company whose HQ was also located in Archangel, transported 11% of Russia's river cargoes.<sup>3</sup> The carrying capacity of the single «Severnaya» (Northern) rail-road, which connected the Archangel area with the central part of the country – was approx. 750 wagons per day.<sup>4</sup> The main connecting point of all transporting ways was the Archangel marine and river port. Its technical equipment allowed to transfer approx. 80,000 tons of cargo per month.<sup>5</sup>

The dozen of the mechanical engineering factories of the Archangel county, with the biggest Solombala plant (SMZ) and «Krasnaya Kuznitsa» shipyard among them, mainly served the needs of the main branches of the local industry and transport. The Molotovsk (now Severodvinsk) Navy shipyard («plant Nr402») which was founded in 1936 was an exception among them. Before the war it started the construction of the ships for the youngest Soviet Fleet.

Hundreds of small factories of consumer goods and local industry, as well as agricultural and fishing collective farms were called upon to provide the population of the Northern area with some sorts of food and staple goods.

The special features of the industrial complex of the Russian North determined its reconstruction and functioning in the wartime period.

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Though the created system was quite sufficient for the war conditions the beginning of the war caused very complicated problems, which ought to be solved urgently. The main one among them was «the staff problem» directly connected with the mobilization to the Front. More than 120,000 citizens of the Archangel county – 1/3 part of the male population of the area – were mobilized to the Red army during the war; 66,000 of them were mobilized during the first three months of the war.

The German «Blitzkrieg» offensive led to the losses of a huge amount of resources as well as to breaking the traditional ties in economy and in transport. They stopped or strictly limited the supplies of the raw materials, spare parts and fuel to the civilian enterprises. Many factories were ruined during the enemy's air raids or diversion acts. Two dozen houses, three factories were burnt down in Archangel during the German air attacks at the end of August 1942 only. The mass evacuation of the industrial enterprises and population led to the new quite

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<sup>3</sup> RSFSR v tsifrah, 1977, 65; Narodnoye hozyaistvo Arkhangelskoi oblasti, 1957, 102.

<sup>4</sup> RGAE. F.1884 Op.41 D.834 L.59.

<sup>5</sup> RGAE. F.8045 Op.3 D.1234 L.7.

complicated problems: transportation, arranging living conditions for the population, launching up of the evacuated enterprises, etc.

In order to overcome the problems of the war the system needed to find means both inside and outside the country.

The war demanded first of all the urgent and total mobilization of all the resources all the country through. The slogan «***Totally Everything — for the Front!***» became the main slogan of the moment reflecting the new main aim of the system and its citizens. It was proclaimed already in the first Party documents and leaders' speeches. The total mobilization of the resources objectively needs the strengthening of the control over them first of all. Whilst the new level of inspecting demanded the strengthening of the centralization of the power and creating the special emergency state bodies. It is not by accident that almost a week after the beginning of the war such an emergency HQ — GKO (*Gosudarstvennyj Komitet Oborony* — State Defense Committee) with Stalin at the head was set up. Local administrations of the Western regions created their own emergency departments — GOKO (*Gorodskoi Komitet Oborony* — City Defense Committee). On September 14, 1942 after the severe bombardment of Archangel such GOKO was arranged in the Northern area as well. It included 4 key-persons of the region with the First secretary (G.P. Ogorodnikov) of the Archangel County Party Committee at the head. The Archangel GOKO endowed itself with the emergency authority in the «sphere of defense» first of all. It was dismissed only at the end of 1944 after the Petsamo-Kirkeness operation and withdrawal of the Germans from Finland and Finnmark.

Leaning on the factors of influencing people's activity — first of all such as «fear» and total propaganda — this system managed to mobilize all the resources in a very short period of time. The most vivid examples that illustrate this were the mobilization or evacuation campaigns. Perhaps not a single system in the world history managed in a period of one month to withdraw 1,500 plants and more than 10 million people (the population of an average European country) at the distance of some thousand miles from West to East. After one more month most of these plants started to function quite properly. At least they produced the first production for the Front's requirements.

As one of the main problems of the war was the problem of staff, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with a special decision June 26, 1941 «allowed» local administrations to prolong the working time period for 3 extra hours per day (Bogoljubov, 1969, 37-38). The simple arithmetic estimates show that this decision compensated the resignation of all workers who were mobilized at the beginning of

the war. For instance, the prolonging of the shift by 3 hours extra for 19 thousand workers of all Archangel-city sawmills was equal to recruiting 7 thousand new-experienced employees.

Later on the further mobilizations were compensated mainly due to the recruiting of women, as well as teenagers and pensioners and including them into the «socialist competition».

At the same time it meant that the main load of the rare problems and intensification of labor lay on the shoulders of these categories of the population.

The drafting of labor from among the GULAG prisoners, including POWs, assisted to solve in some way the «staff problem» in the USSR as well.

The German «Blitzkrieg» led to the enormous technical losses of the Red army. During the first three weeks of the German invasion the Soviet Army lost 6,000 aircraft, 10,000 tanks, 60,000 automobiles. By December «irrecoverable losses» of the Red army amounted to 20,500 tanks and armored vehicles, 18,000 aircraft, more than 100,000 guns or mortars. Only according to the official statistics of the Defense Ministry more than 2.8 million soldiers were killed or taken prisoners (Krivosheev, 1993, 157, 367; Chadaev, 1985, 85). The invaders captured or ruined thousands of factories, plants and farms which produced 1/3 of the gross output of the USSR including 50% of black metals, 60% of coal, 38% of grain and 84% of sugar (Chadaev, 1985, 83, 317).

In order to arrange the defense against the invaders it was necessary to build up in fact another army as strong as the Red army of the pre-wartime period and in the *shortest period of time*. That meant not only mobilizing millions of soldiers into the army, but the Soviet economy had to supply them with all the necessary ammunition, food and weapons.

So, the leaders of the Soviet industry understood the slogan «Totally Everything — for the Front!» as «Everything that does not work for the Front — is inexpedient!». That is why every plant, factory or a small workshop started to produce things which they considered to be useful for the Front's needs. For instance, the shipyard «Krasnaya Kuznitsa» in Archangel in a period of one month arranged the production of the battle propeller-driven sleighs for the K.Rokossovsky army which defended Moscow in winter 1941-1942. The Arhbum paper mill started the production of «the powder cellulose». Archangel sawmills arranged making wooden mines, sledges and skis for the Karelian front. Small repair shops started to produce field kitchens, mess-tins and even mine-throwers. One can see the same process all the country through. As a result, already at the beginning of 1942 the ordinary things which

were of the first need in the everyday life, like matches, soap, kitchen stuff, disappeared from the shops. By the fall of 1942 the Soviet industry produced as many tanks, guns or aircraft as were built in Germany and all its European satellites. At the same time the total military production (re-conversion) led to the serious disproportion in the Soviet economy in favor of the defense needs (i.e. military industrial complex). The country started to look like a colossus but... with feet of clay.

One can see similar processes in the transport system of the USSR. With the beginning of the war they opened the «green roads» for all transports with military cargoes. It meant that all trains, river or sea boats with the cargoes for the Front were considered to be «traveling warrants», i.e. of the first importance. All the rest of the trains could stay at the side tracks for many days or even weeks. Due to such new order of functioning of the transport system, e.g. it took 3 months for the financial director of the Archangel port (who was considered to be VIP at that time) to come back from Moscow to Archangel in the autumn of 1941. In a peaceful time it takes usually one day only.

In 1943 with the start of the liberation of the occupied Soviet territory whose transport system was totally destroyed, the Soviet government could not find any other internal resource except to strengthen the discipline of the sailors and railway employees. That is why in the spring of 1943 the GKO introduced the martial law at all main means of transport. It meant that in fact all of the transport employees became mobilized military men. The appropriate regulations, special uniform and military discipline were introduced for them as well.

So, the disproportion in the industrial sphere led to the similar disproportion in the transport sphere.

Stalin in his orders on the occasion of the «great Soviet holidays» demanded to crush the invaders by the end of 1942.<sup>6</sup> Who knows if these orders were realizable: the internal resources of Stalin's system could be enough to finish the war in one year. But the enemy appeared to be stronger and the war dragged on.

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That is why the aid, which was supplied from the USA and the UK, came just in time. It speeded up the process of industrialization and technological modernization of the Soviet economy, and helped much in solving the main war problems of the USSR.

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<sup>6</sup> See the newspaper «Pravda» 1942, the issues for February 23 and May 1.



18,763 aircraft, 11,567 tanks and armored vehicles, 548 war ships and other supplies worth more than \$13.3 billion helped, first of all, to release manpower, i.e. indirectly to solve the main problem of the war – the staff problem (Suprun, 2002, 224; Suprun, 1997, 350). In order to produce the supplied materials they would have needed to engage no less than 8–9 million of employees for a period of one year.<sup>7</sup> As far as the Russian North was concerned, the manpower that was used for the production of the lend-lease supplies to this area a priori freed up thousands of workers as well.

First of all, the total amount of the supplies were sent to the Red Army and Fleet, including the detachments located in the North. By the end of the war thanks to the Allied aid the Northern Fleet grew up thrice. 80% of all fighters and torpedo-aircraft in the Russian North in 1944 were produced by the Allied as well. Hundreds of RADAR sets, American 120-mm and 90-mm AA guns, tanks, amphibious supplied by the Allies were of considerable significance for defending the Russian North during the war. At the same time they played a very important role in building up the military industrial complex (*Voенно-Промышленныj Комплекс — VPK*) after the war.

The transport supplies were of great significance for the USSR as well. During the war period the Allies sent to Russia 1,860 locomotives, 11,115 railway cars, thousands of tons of the railway equipment, 435 000 trucks and jeeps (more than twice of the total amount of the cars produced in the USSR during the war period), 71 merchant vessels, more than 1,600 cranes and excavators, a lot of navigation equipment and port facilities.<sup>8</sup>

Besides that the Allies supplied a huge amount of petroleum products, the quality of which was much better than the Soviet. The petroleum supplies occupied 12% of the total lend-lease supplies to the USSR, i.e. in the total tonnage they were at the 4<sup>th</sup> place after weapons, food and metals. Together with the above mentioned materials, the Allies sent to the Soviet Russia some technological lines and even fully equipped factories: 4 oil refineries, tire, tin-preserving, car-assembly plants, more than 1,000 mobile power stations, etc.

As for the transport system of the North this aid played a significant role as well. As the main point of this system was the Archangel port, the majority of the transport supplies came to it first of all. Already in 1942 9 foreign cranes were

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<sup>7</sup> The approximate calculations were done based on the fact that every employee produced goods to the value of at least \$5 per day. It was similar to Ru27,0 according to the official exchange rate or Ru125,0 according to the exchange rate of the «black market».

<sup>8</sup> RGAE. F.413 Op.9 D.438 L.10, 13-14, 16, 21; D.553 L.2; Suprun, 2002, 224.

installed in Archangel port. By the end of the war 15 American port cranes «Starport-pick» and «Clyde», 13 railway cranes «Orton», and 7 caterpillars «Marion» and 8 «Lorain» were installed in the Archangel port. Alongside with the small cranes two British floating cranes «Empire Bard» and «Empire Elgar» which arrived in Archangel in 1942 had been working in Archangel and Murmansk till 1944 too.

In 1940 the port had 6 trucks only, whilst in 1944 — 108 trucks and jeeps. 97 of them were of the American or British manufacture. Due to the Allies' supplies of the port facilities the rate of the unloading of the transports in Archangel port increased twice.<sup>9</sup> In order to prolong the navigation period of the Archangel port, which usually freezes in winter, the Allies sent to Russia the Canadian icebreaker «Mont calm» («Severny veter»).

Many American and British trucks, locomotives and transport planes were also used at the Northern routes. For instance, 2 of the 6 «Lancasters» of the Royal Air Force which were left in Archangel after the operation «Paravan» (September 1944) were in use in the Arctic till the end of the 1950s. Li-2 (C-47), which was constructed under the American license as well as C-47s themselves, were considered to be the best transport aircraft in the Russian Arctic till the 1960s.

The Allies' supplies of the means of communication had also played a significant role in operating troops and managing industry. The Allies' communication supplies to the Soviet Union were as many as to set up more than 500 field divisions. By the end of the war 80% of all means of communication of the Soviet Army and Fleet were of the American or British manufacture.<sup>10</sup>

A lot of the foreign means of communication were used in the industrial complex of the USSR. Alongside with the 3-channel systems of high frequency telephoning the Americans supplied new, more complicated 12-channel systems. The USSR had no such analogues at all.

They were immediately installed at the lines between Moscow and the biggest Soviet cities: Leningrad, Kiev and Har'kov. Such American military radio stations as № 299, № 399, № 499 were of a wide use in fishing, electrical industry, at the marine and river vessels.

In the meantime, the whole broadcasting system of the USSR was provided by two American 50-watt radio-transmitters «M-83330A» only. They were installed in

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<sup>9</sup> RGAE. F.8045 Op.3 D.488 L.3; D.1233 L.37; Edlinsky, 1963, 152–153.

<sup>10</sup> RGAE. F.413 Op.9 D.562 L.15-23, 27-28, 30; D.548 L.189.

1944 in Moscow and Kiev. 4 other transmitters of the kind were transferred to the Soviet police system (*Narodny Komisariat Vnutrennyh Del* - NKVD).<sup>11</sup>

At the beginning of the war the most important *civilian* telephone and radio lines of communication were transferred under the control of the military and NKVD detachments. And the main amount of the new Allies' communication equipment was sent to them as well. But at the same time some parts of the phone and radio facilities were left for the civilian needs as well. For example, most of the 120 new trunk-line points which were arranged during the war period in Archangel county were fitted with the lend-lease equipment.<sup>12</sup> Many American radio stations № 299, № 399 or № 499 were installed on river and sea vessels, as well as at the fishing motorboats of the Northern area. In 1944 a new American 15-watt radio station was installed in Archangel area instead of the old 1-watt one. It made radio communication both more stable and long-range.

As the majority of the Northern industrial enterprises like timber or paper mills as well as the machine-building factories which were servicing the main branch of the Northern industry were considered to function mostly for «the civilian purposes», they had received a very small part of the lend-lease supplies during the war. A dozen of lorries, tractors and cranes as well as some machine-tool benches made in USA or UK and sent according to the lend-lease act, were noticed at that time at Solombala machine building plant and Solombala craft mill, Arkhbum pulp and paper mill and some big sawmills of Archangel.

Even shipyards became an exception among the Northern industrial enterprises due to the extraordinary obstacles and pressing requests of their leaders. For instance, only after the diversion in March 1942 at the «Krasnaya Kuznitsa», which destroyed the main tool workshop of the plant, the shipyard received two dozens of the US machine benches, special tools, telephones and the 350-ton hydro press, which is in use till now. Thanks to this aid the yard was repaid in a month and continued its normal functioning. Some Allies' instruments and benches were delivered to the ship-building plant № 402 in Molotovsk (now Severodvinsk) only after the urgent letter of its director in April 1943 to the Peoples Commissar Anastas Mikoyan, who was in charge of the lend-lease supplies in Russia (Suprun, 2000, 78-79).

The Allies' supplies were of significant importance for the common Victory in the war. But they were of no less importance for the post-war development of the

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<sup>11</sup> RGAE. F.413 Op.9 D.548 L.47, 50, 172.

<sup>12</sup> GAAO. F.4372 Op.7 D.130 L.10; D.186 L.6 D.229 L.17; D.313 L.16.

country also. Mainly due to the usage of the foreign technological methods. It is well known that the Soviet torpedo boat of project Nr201 was copied from the American «Vosper» and «Elko».<sup>13</sup> The high quality of the lend-lease ships allowed Soviet engineers to solve some quite complicated problems like arranging automatic management on ice-breakers and other ships.

More than 10,000 American diesels supplied to the USSR played an important role in shipbuilding and transportation. The majority of the Soviet military motorboats constructed in 1944-1945 had the American «Packard» or «Hall Scott» motors. As for the navigation facilities, which were supplied by the Allies, they were enough to provide the needs of the navigation service in the Caspian and Azov seas, for instance.<sup>14</sup>

But one should not forget that the lend-lease supplies came to the countries base on the concept of the «pool», i.e. that every Allies nation contributed to the «pool» whatever it could for the victory and pulled out what it needed for the warfare. It means that contribution to the victory of every Ally nation was mostly equal. The defense of the «Russian Front» by the Red Army in the global strategy of the coalition was quite equal to the contribution of the USA, Great Britain, Canada, as well as other 40 nations of the Allied coalition.

One more external factor, which was of significant importance for the process of the industrialization and modernization, were reparations. Their value for Russia could be compared with lend-lease supplies — approx. \$11-12 billion. But they were delivered after the war.

So, during the war period the totalitarian system centralized itself in order to solve the main problems of the war. Totally everything that was done at the beginning of the war was done for the Front's sake. Thanks to the strict centralization the system managed in a very short period of time to mobilize all the resources and stop the enemy's offensive. But the total mobilization for the Front's needs led to the disproportions in the economy in favor of the military industry. By the end of the war the country looked like a giant on feet of clay. This giant needed to lean on crutches. The first crutch the giant received from the Allies in the form of the lend-lease aid, the second one he took later on himself - in the form of reparations.

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<sup>13</sup> RGAE F.413 Op.9 D.553 L.7-8; Shitikov et al., 1995, 270.

<sup>14</sup> RGAE. F.413 Op.9 D.553 L.15, 38; D.506 L.154.

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Professor Michael Suprun graduated from the Pomor State University (now The Northern Arctic Federal University), then – from the Leningrad branch of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and later from the Institute of Russian History of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, where he defended his doctoral dissertation on “Lend-lease and the Northern Convoys”. As a senior visitor he lectured and did research at the Moscow State University (1989), Oxford University (1994), George Washington University (1998–1999), Krakow Jagiellonian University (2000), Tromsø University (2003), the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences (2009). He is the author of over 180 scientific works, including 14 books as well as the compiler, editor and author of the year-books "The Northern Convoys: studies, memoirs and documents" (Moscow-Arkhangelsk, 1991–2001) and "The Forced Labor and the Political Exile in the North of Russia" (SPtb -Arkhangelsk , 2003–2010).

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