Fatter or Fitter? On rewarding and training in a contest
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Abstract

Competition between heterogeneous participants often leads to low effort provision in contests. We consider a principal who can divide her fixed budget between skill-enhancing training and the contest prize. Training can reduce heterogeneity, which increases effort. But it also reduces the contest prize, which makes effort fall. We set up an incomplete-information contest with heterogeneous players and show how this trade-off is related to the size of the budget when the principal maximizes expected effort. A selection problem can also arise in this framework in which there is a cost associated with a contest win by the inferior player. This gives the principal a larger incentive to train the expected laggard, reducing the size of the prize on offer.

Keywords: contest, skill-enhancement, budget division, selection problem

JEL codes: D74, D72, D82
1 Introduction

How should an employer get the most out of her work force? Similarly, how should a research council get the most out of researchers? The standard answer in many such contexts is: set up a contest with a prize to the winner – like a promotion or a research grant. But, as many contest organizers have observed, contests do not incentivize well when there are big differences among the contestants at the outset.\(^1\) So the modified answer is: set up a contest, and seek to level the playing field among the contestants.\(^2\) But what if levelling the playing field is costly? In such cases, the contest organizer might have to trade off the prize to the winner with spending resources on training the contestants so that they are both better equipped to put in effort in the contest and more interested in doing so.\(^3\)

We address the question of how to find the best balance between prize and training in a setting where a principal organizing a contest has a fixed budget that she can split between a prize, which will incentivize the contestants to put in more effort, and skill-improving training, which will make the effort put in by a contestant more productive. When there are \textit{ex-ante} differences in the contestants’ skills, there is also a question of who to train.

In our model, there are two contestants who compete in an all-pay auction, meaning that the winner is the contestant with the higher effort. A contestant’s \textit{ex-ante} skills are not known by the other contestant, nor by the principal. But everybody knows the probability distribution that each contestant’s skill is drawn from. The \textit{ex-ante} leader is the one with skills drawn from the better distribution, while the other one is called the \textit{ex-ante} laggard.

When the principal aims at maximizing the contestants’ total expected efforts, it turns out that the exact nature of her decision on how to split her budget between prize and training depends on how large the budget is. With a medium-sized budget, the principal spends resources on training the laggard exactly so that any \textit{ex-ante} differences are evened out, with the rest of the budget being spent on the prize. When the budget is small, the budget is optimally split between the prize and training of the \textit{ex-ante} laggard, but such that the \textit{ex-ante} difference is not totally evened out; and if the budget is very small, there will be no training and the whole budget is spent on the prize. When the budget is large, there is room for training both contestants in such a way that the \textit{ex-ante} difference is first evened out, and then the expected abilities of both contestants are increased symmetrically, while still having funds for a prize.

We also discuss the case where the principal cares about having the right winner of the contest. Since skills are uncertain \textit{ex-ante}, there is a chance that the winner is not the \textit{ex-post} more efficient contestant. In order to take care of


\(^2\)See, e.g., the survey by Chowdury, et al. (2020). They do not discuss, as we do here, cases where levelling the playing field is costly.

\(^3\)Training occurs \textit{ex ante}, before type is drawn, whereas the prize is an \textit{ex post} expenditure.
this problem, the principal should aim at minimizing the probability of erroneous selection. Interestingly, the size of the prize plays no role in this problem, so the only remaining issue is how to split the training part of the budget between the two contestants. We show that the probability of erroneous selection is not monotonic in the amount of training given.

In addition to simply minimizing the probability of selecting the less efficient contestant, we also consider the case in which the principal cares about the expected cost of erroneous selection (as measured by the difference in ability between the winner and the more efficient loser). Maximizing a weighted combination of expected effort minus expected selection cost, we show that the principal is more likely to offer training to the laggard for lower budgets, the less weight is placed on effort.

Our paper builds on earlier discussions of all-pay auctions where players have private information about their valuations, such as Amann and Leininger (1996) and Clark and Riis (2001). In particular, Clark and Riis (2001) is close to our basic framework, since they posit two players where one has its skill drawn from a more advantageous distribution than the other, so that they, ex-ante, are leader and laggard. See also Seel (2014), where the private information is one-sided, in that one player’s valuation is known by both players.

This paper is related to the discussion of whether and how to rectify ex-ante biases among contestants. See, in particular, Li and Yu (2012), Kirkegaard (2012), and Franke, et al. (2018) for discussions on how to increase total effort by rectifying these biases. Our present analysis differs from the previous work in insisting that favouring a contestant is costly and will, in the face of a fixed total budget for the contest designer, imply a lower prize for the contest winner.

The paper also relates to studies of pre-contest investments. For example, Konrad (2002) discusses a contestant’s incentives to invest in own productivity before a contest. In contrast, we discuss the principal’s incentives for such pre-contest investments. Clark and Nilssen (2013) analyze contestants’ incentives to put in extra effort in the first round of a two-round competition where there is complete information and learning by doing. They discuss how the contest designer can split her prize budget across the two rounds in order to get the right balance between first-round learning and second-round efforts. This is related to the present discussion of pre-contest training versus prize award; the framework of the present paper is quite different, however, since heterogeneous players compete under incomplete information, and the ex post effect of training is not deterministic.

Our paper relates to discussions in personnel economics on whether to improve productivity by investing in workers’ skills or by increasing result-based compensation; see, for example, Lazear and Oyer (2012, Sec. 5). In that literature, focus is on cases where contestants have direct benefits from their skill levels; in the case of

\footnote{Also other instruments have been suggested to increase efforts in asymmetric contests: Che and Gale (1998) discuss putting limits on contestants’ efforts; Mealem and Nitzan (2016) discuss affecting the contestants’ contest success functions and win valuations; Sisak (2009) discusses changing the prize structure; Clark and Nilssen (2020a, 2020b) discuss how to split the prize fund between early and late prizes in order to counter the effect of ex-ante differences among contestants.}
workers, this occurs typically because higher skills make them more attractive on
the future job market, in addition to helping in getting high compensation in the
present job. Here, we disregard such direct benefits from skills, instead focusing
on the principal’s need for balancing spending on training and compensation.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic contest played
between heterogeneous participants. Section 3 considers how an effort maximizing
principal will divide her budget between training and the contest prize. Section 4
focuses on the selection problem in which a low-ability contestant can win the con-
test; the trade-off between the prize and training is considered here for a principal
that maximizes a weighted sum of the expected contest effort and the expected
cost of erroneous selection. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are to be found in the
Appendix.

2 The contest

Two risk neutral players compete for a prize of size \( v \) by exerting irreversible efforts
\( x_i \geq 0, i = 1, 2 \). The cost of effort to player \( i \) is given by \( \alpha_i x_i \), where \( \alpha_i \) is an ability
parameter that is private information to that player. It is commonly known that
player 1 draws ability from a uniform distribution on \([h, H]\), and player 2 from a
uniform distribution on \([l, L]\). We make the following assumption:

**Assumption.** (i) \( H - h = L - l \equiv D \). (ii) \( H \geq L > h \geq l > 0 \). (iii) \( \frac{H}{l} > \frac{4}{3} \).

Part (i) of the assumption implies that the players’ distributions are identical
up to a location shift. Part (ii) means that player 1, without loss of generality,
is taken to be the more able player \textit{ex ante}, with \( H \geq L \). It also implies that
the ability distributions are overlapping, with \( L > h \), which again implies that
\( D > H - L \); and that \( L > D \), since \( l = L - D > 0 \). Part (iii) is a regularity
assumption. It is not a very strong assumption to make. Necessarily, \( \frac{H}{l} > 1 \), since
\( h = H - D > 0 \). Suppose, moreover, that \( L \) approaches \( h \), which would mean that
\( h - l \) would approach \( D \). With \( L - l = D \) and \( l > 0 \), this would imply \( h > D \), or,
since \( h = H - D, \frac{H}{l} > 2 \), which is stricter than the assumption we make here.

The player with the largest effort wins the prize with certainty, with ties bro-
den randomly, as depicted by the following contest success function giving the
probability that player 1 wins the prize:

\[
p_1(x_1, x_2) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } x_1 > x_2; \\
\frac{1}{2} & \text{if } x_1 = x_2; \\
0 & \text{if } x_1 < x_2. 
\end{cases}
\]

At the contest stage, player \( i \) knows his own ability but not the ability of the
opponent. The expected payoffs of type \( a_i \) can be written as

\[
\pi_1(x_1, x_2, a_1) = \left( \Pr(x_1 > x_2) + \frac{1}{2} \Pr(x_1 = x_2) \right) v - \frac{x_1}{a_1} \\
\pi_2(x_1, x_2, a_2) = \left( \Pr(x_2 > x_1) + \frac{1}{2} \Pr(x_1 = x_2) \right) v - \frac{x_2}{a_2}
\]
Let the effort function \( x_i(a_i) \) of player \( i \) be a mapping from the player’s ability to his chosen effort. And suppose it is continuous and strictly increasing (except possibly at zero), which implies that there exists an inverse \( g_i(x_i) = x_i^{-1}(x_i) = a_i, \ i = 1, 2. \) Since abilities are uniformly distributed, we can write expected payoffs for the two players as

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi_1(x_1, x_2, a_1) &= \frac{g_2(x_1) - l}{D} - \frac{x_1}{a_1}, \\
\pi_2(x_1, x_2, a_2) &= \frac{g_1(x_2) - h}{D} - \frac{x_2}{a_2}.
\end{align*}
\]

Using arguments explained in Clark and Riis (2001), we can state the following result, the proof of which is in the Appendix.

**Proposition 1** The unique pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium is given by the equilibrium effort functions

\[
x_i^*(a_i) = \frac{L(a_i^2 - h^2)}{2DH} v, \text{ for } a_i \in [h, H].
\]

\[
x_2^*(a_2) = \begin{cases} 
0, & \text{for } a_2 \in [l, \frac{Lh}{2}] \\
\frac{a_2^2H^2 - L^2h^2}{2DLH} v, & \text{for } a_2 \in (\frac{Lh}{2}, L].
\end{cases}
\]

Whilst almost all player-1 types have positive effort, some low player-2 types \((a_2 \in [l, \frac{Lh}{2}])\) do not find it worthwhile to compete. Note that the two players’ equilibrium effort functions have the same support, \([\alpha, \bar{\alpha}] = [0, \frac{H}{L}(H - \frac{D}{2})]\). Note also that, when the players draw their valuations from the same uniform distribution \((i.e., \text{when } L = H)\), the equilibrium effort functions are

\[
x_i^*(a_i) = \frac{a_i^2 - h^2}{2D} v, \ i = 1, 2.
\]

Figure 1 gives an illustration of the equilibrium in Proposition 1, showing that the equilibrium effort function of the \textit{ex-ante} less able player 2 lies over that of player 1. The superior opponent uses his expected edge to slack off and save on effort cost. This means that a player-2 type of inferior ability can beat a more able player-1 type. When the players have drawn the same ability \(a_1 = a_2 = a\), which of course can only happen if \(a > h\), it is easy to verify from (3) and (4) that

\[
x_2^*(a) > x_1^*(a).
\]

The \textit{ex-ante} total expected efforts \((i.e., \text{before the draws are made})\) are

\[
X^* = E (x_1^*) + E (x_2^*)
\]

\[
= \frac{LH}{2D} v \int_{h}^{H} (a_i^2 - h^2) \frac{1}{D} da_1 + \frac{v}{2DHL} \int_{\frac{Lh}{2}}^{L} (a_2^2H^2 - L^2h^2) \frac{1}{D} da_2
\]

\[
= \frac{L (3H - 2D)}{6H} v + \frac{L^2 (3H - 2D)}{6H^2} v
\]

\[
= \frac{L (3H - 2D) (H + L)}{6H^2} v.
\]
where we use the substitution $h = H - D$.

Note that the ratio of the expected efforts has a simple form:

$$\frac{E(x_1^*)}{E(x_2^*)} = \frac{H}{L} \geq 1.$$  

Thus, even if, for a given $a$, player 2 has the higher effort, the *ex-ante* expected effort is higher for player 1. Moreover, in the case of symmetry, when $L = H$, the expression in (7) reduces to

$$\left(H - \frac{2}{3}D\right)\nu.$$ (8)

Player 1 wins the contest with certainty if player 2 draws a type in the interval $[l, \frac{H}{2} D]$, since 2 then has zero effort in equilibrium; player 1 also wins if $x_1^*(a_1) > x_2^*(a_2)$, which by Proposition 1 occurs for $a_2 < \frac{H}{2} a_1$. Hence, the probability that player 1 of type $a_1$ wins is $\frac{1}{T} \left( \frac{a_1 L}{H} - l \right)$; taking the expectation of this over all player-1 types gives the *ex-ante* probability that player 1 wins the contest in equilibrium as

$$p_1^* = \int_h^H \frac{1}{D} \left( \frac{a_1 L}{H} - l \right) \frac{1}{D} da_1 = 1 - \frac{L}{2H} \geq \frac{1}{2},$$

where the inequality follows from $L \leq H$.

Even though the *ex-ante* more able player 1 is expected to have more effort, this does not cost him more, since his unit cost of effort is likely to be smaller. In
fact, the expected *ex-ante* costs of effort of the two players are identical:

\[
\int_{h}^{H} x_1^*(a_1) \frac{1}{a_1} \, da_1 = \int_{L}^{h} x_2^*(a_2) \frac{1}{a_2} \, da_2 = \frac{LHv}{4D} \left[ 1 - \frac{h^2}{H^2} \left( 1 + 2 \ln \frac{H}{h} \right) \right].
\]

The *ex-ante* expected payoffs to the players can be found as

\[
E\pi_1^* = \left( 1 - \frac{L}{2H} \right) v - \frac{LHv}{4D} \left[ 1 - \frac{h^2}{H^2} \left( 1 + 2 \ln \frac{H}{h} \right) \right];
\]

\[
E\pi_2^* = \left( \frac{L}{2H} \right) v - \frac{LHv}{4D} \left[ 1 - \frac{h^2}{H^2} \left( 1 + 2 \ln \frac{H}{h} \right) \right];
\]

where the expected payoff to player 1 is higher, since he has the higher win probability in equilibrium and the players have the same expected cost of effort.

3 Training to maximize effort

Suppose the principal aims at maximizing the total *ex-ante* expected efforts of the contestant. She has available a fixed budget \( B \), which can be divided between giving the contest prize \( v \) and investing in the abilities of the players with \( s_1 \geq 0 \) and \( s_2 \geq 0 \), respectively. Budget balance requires \( B = v + s_1 + s_2 \).

The development of ability at the training stage is modelled as an upward shift in the ability interval of the receiving player, keeping the length of the interval constant at \( D \). With expenditure \( s_i \), the ability improvement is simply \( s_i \); following expenditures of \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \) on the two players, the ability interval of player 1 becomes \([h + s_1, H + s_1]\), while player 2 has \([l + s_2, L + s_2]\).

At the beginning of the game, the principal announces a triple \((v, s_1, s_2)\) that satisfies budget balance. If either of the training amounts is positive, then training takes place. Then draws are made from the modified ability distributions. After this the contest is played over the prize \( v \).

In the discussion below, we need to take care that, also after any training is carried out, the skill distributions of the players still have an overlap, which amounts to requiring \( s_1 - s_2 > H - L - D \). Moreover, we need to keep track of whether or not the *ex-ante* laggard, player 2, stays the laggard also after training, that is, we need to know whether or not \( s_2 - s_1 \leq H - L \). When both these restrictions are satisfied, we have

\[
-(H - L - D) < s_2 - s_1 \leq H - L. \tag{9}
\]

To facilitate comparative-statics analysis when the lower and upper bounds of the interval are changed, it is convenient to rewrite the equilibrium effort functions in (3) and (4) using \( h = H - D, l = L - D \), since \( D \) is constant. We have

\[
x_1^*(a_1) = \frac{L \left[ a_1^2 - (H - D)^2 \right]}{2DH} v, \text{ for } a_1 \in [H - D, H]. \tag{10}
\]

\[
x_2^*(a_2) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
0, & \text{for } a_2 \in [L - D, \frac{L(H-D)}{H}]; \\
\frac{a_2^2H^2 - L^2(H-D)^2}{2DHL} v, & \text{for } a_2 \in \left( \frac{L(H-D)}{H}, L \right]. \tag{11}
\end{array} \right.
\]
We can now analyze the effect that increasing the expected ability of one of the players will have on the equilibrium effort functions. Suppose first that the support of the distribution for the laggard is moved up (i.e., $l$ and $L$ increase). The effect that this has on the equilibrium effort functions is drawn in Figure 2 for a shift from $L$ to $L' > L$, where the new equilibrium efforts are given by $x_i^{*'}(a_i)$.\textsuperscript{5}

From this, it is apparent that the effects on the effort functions are monotonic; all player-1 abilities increase their efforts, since the rival is now expected to be more able than before. The laggard responds to the expected increase in ability by providing less effort. On the other hand, the high player-2 types will have effort above the previous maximum level. The common upper support of both players increases to $\bar{x}$.

Figure 3 depicts the effects of increasing the expected ability of the leader, i.e., increasing $(h, H)$ to $(h'', H'')$.\textsuperscript{6}

Whilst the response of the receiving player 1 is to lower effort for all ability levels, except at the top of the distribution, the response of player 2 is to decrease effort for low ability levels and increase it for high ones. There are also fewer player 2 types that have positive effort when the opponent becomes more superior in expectation.

The principal knows that player 1 is the expectedly more able; since she does not know the actual draws made by the rivals, the principal does not know which

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\textsuperscript{5}The support moves upwards so that $L' - l' = D$.

\textsuperscript{6}$H'' - h'' = D$. 
of the players is most able ex post. As illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, increasing the expected ability of the laggard causes the effort function of the leader to shift upwards and that of the laggard to shift downward; increasing the expected ability of the leader reduces the efforts of that player and of low laggard types, but increases the effort of higher-ability laggards.

Dividing the budget between the prize and training for one of the players is not a straightforward problem as demonstrated above. The problem becomes more complex when both can receive training. However, as it turns out, under our assumption that $\frac{H}{\Delta} > \frac{4}{3}$, the principal will not support the ex-ante leader with any training, except if the budget is large, so that the optimum is to split the budget between a prize to the contest winner and training of the ex-ante laggard. In particular, we have:\footnote{For $1 < \frac{H}{\Delta} \leq \frac{4}{3}$, we would have training of the leader also at low levels of $B$.}

**Proposition 2** A principal with a budget of $B$ will split the budget on prize and training as follows:

(i) An insufficient budget, i.e., one where

$$0 < B \leq \frac{L(H + L)}{H + 2L},$$

will lead to no training and $v = B$.

(ii) If the budget is small, i.e., if

$$\frac{L(H + L)}{H + 2L} < B \leq \frac{5}{3}H - L, \quad (12)$$
then the principal spends \( s_2 \) on training the ex-ante laggard and the rest, \( B - s_2 \), on the prize, where

\[
s_2 = \frac{1}{3} \left( B - H - 2L + \sqrt{(B + H + L)^2 - H (B + L)} \right).
\]  

(iii) If the budget is of an intermediate size, i.e. if

\[
\frac{5}{3} H - L < B \leq 3H - L - \frac{4}{3} D,
\]

then the principal trains the ex ante laggard until the two players have equal expected skills,

\[
s_2 = H - L,
\]

and uses the rest, \( B - H + L \), as the contest prize.

(iv) If the budget is large, i.e., if

\[
B > 3H - L - \frac{4}{3} D,
\]

then the principal first spends training on the ex-ante laggard until the two players have equal expected skills, and thereafter spends equal amount of training on both players so that they continue to have equal expected skills. Total spending on training is \( S = s_1 + s_2 \), while the rest of the budget, \( B - S \), is spent on the prize, where

\[
S = \frac{1}{6} (3B - 3H - 3L + 4D) \\
\]

\[
s_1 = \frac{3 (S - (H - L))}{2} \\
\]

\[
s_2 = \frac{3 (H - L) - S}{2}.
\]

Consider first part (i), which indicates the case in which training is completely sacrificed in order to give a contest prize as large as possible. When the principal is resource constrained in this way, training the laggard has a positive effect on total effort ceteris paribus, but this directly reduces the contest prize, reducing effort. The second effect outweighs the first, and no training is given.

When the budget is larger, but not enough that it pays to make the players symmetric (part (ii)), total effort initially rises when the laggard is trained, but then falls as the prize becomes lower and lower. The amount of the budget used on training balances these two effects, finding an internal division of the budget. Increasing the budget further, as in part (iii), allows the laggard to be trained until the contestants are equal in expected ability, putting the remainder of the budget into the prize fund. Finally, in part (iv), the budget is so large that the initial laggard can be trained so that he catches up the expected leader, and then both players can be made more efficient. This occurs until the marginal effect of spending one unit of the budget on training is equal to the marginal effect of giving that unit as a prize.
The relationship between the size of the budget and the total expected effort is then straightforward to determine as

\[ X^* = \begin{cases} 
\frac{L(3H-2D)(H+L)}{6H^2}, & \text{for } 0 < B \leq \frac{L(H+L)}{H+2L}, \\
\frac{L(H+L)}{162H^2} < B \leq \frac{5}{3}H - L, \\
\frac{L(3H+3L-4D)^2}{12}, & \text{for } B > 3H - L - \frac{4}{3}D; 
\end{cases} \]

where \( \Psi := B + L + \sqrt{B^2 + (H + 2L)B + (H^2 + HL + L^2)}. \) The second and fourth parts of this function are increasing and convex in \( B. \) For very small and for intermediate budget sizes, the first and third parts indicate that extra budget is completely given to the prize, increasing expected effort linearly. This relationship between \( B \) and \( X^* \) is illustrated in Figure 4.\(^8\)

For low budget levels, all funds are spent on the contest prize, and expected effort is a fixed proportion of this, as indicated by (7). When the budget reaches \( \frac{L(H+L)}{H+2L} \), it is possible to do better than this by training the laggard. Figure 2 shows that the leader will increase effort for all ability types but that the laggard will reduce effort, apart from the high types that are created by the training. Initially, as the budget increases beyond \( \frac{L(H+L)}{H+2L} \), the net effect is positive and large enough to outweigh the fact that resources are taken away from the contest prize, which reduces effort. As further resources are used on training player 2, the players become more and more alike in expected ability; this levelling of the playing field increases effort. If the principal has a total budget of \( \frac{2}{3}H - L \), then training is given until the players are symmetric; hence, \( H - L \) is used on training player

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\(^8\)Figure 4 is generic, but \( H = 2, D = 1, \) and \( L = 1.25 \) are used as parameter values here.
2, and $2\tilde{H}$ is the contest prize. An increase in the budget from this point will optimally be put in its entirety into the prize fund; however, when the budget becomes large enough \((3H - L - \frac{4}{9}D)\), some resources are allocated to training both players, keeping them symmetric and increasing their ability in the contest. This leads to an increase in expected effort that is larger than would be obtained simply by granting a larger prize.

4 Accounting for the problem of erroneous selection

In settings like the one we study here, it is not clear that the winner of the contest is the \textit{ex-post} more efficient one: the \textit{ex-ante} leader may draw a high skill but still end up losing because of the laggard’s higher efforts. This \textit{ex-post} selection problem – the problem of erroneous selection – is particularly important in settings such as promotion contests and competitions for research grants, where the winner goes on to perform tasks whose qualities may depend on the winner’s skills. In this section, we therefore amend the principal’s decision problem to incorporate a concern for erroneous selection. We do this by first study a principal whose sole aim is to minimize the problem of erroneous selection and then use this analysis to study the general problem of a principal with an interest in both high total expected efforts and low expected costs of erroneous selection.

It is not possible for player 1 to win when player 2 is more able, thus we have no instance of a type-2 error. Player 1 wins when $a_1 > \frac{H}{L}a_2$ and is more able in all such cases. We can calculate the probability of the principal making a type-1 error \textit{ex-post}, \textit{i.e.}, the probability that contestant 2 wins when contestant 1 has the higher \textit{ex-post} ability:

\begin{equation}
\rho^* = \int_L^H \left( \frac{H - \frac{a_1L}{D}}{D} \right) \frac{1}{D} da_1 + \int_h^L \left( \frac{a_1 - \frac{a_1L}{D}}{D} \right) \frac{1}{D} da_1 \tag{15}
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
= \frac{H - L}{2D^2} \left[ \frac{L - (H - D)^2}{H} \right]. \tag{16}
\end{equation}

Note that the size of the prize \(v\) does not affect \(\rho^*\). Moreover, asymmetry (\textit{i.e.}, \(H > L\)) always leads to a positive probability of the contest selecting the player with the lower ability.\footnote{This is true because the square-bracketed term in (16) is always non-negative, since \(L > h = H - D > \frac{(H-D)^2}{H}\).} The calculation of \(\rho^*\) is demonstrated in Figure 5.

Player 1 wins the contest when abilities are in the areas marked by \(A\) in the Figure. In all these cases, $a_1 > a_2$, so the more able is selected as winner. This is also the case for area \(C\) where player 2 wins and is more able. The areas marked by \(b\) and \(b'\) indicate combinations in which player 2 wins but is less able. The first element in (15) represents area \(b\), while the second one is \(b'\). When player 2 receives training, \(L\) increases and the line \(\frac{H}{L}a_2\) moves closer to the 45-degree line. This in itself reduces the areas \(b\) and \(b'\). However, the square of
feasible ability combinations shifts rightward in Figure 5, removing some low-
ability player-2 types (who mostly lose to better player 1 types) and introducing
some higher-ability player-2 types who can beat better opponents. Hence, the
overall effect of training the laggard on the probability of erroneous selection is
generally non-monotonic. In fact, we can state the following result.

**Proposition 3**

(i) If \( \mathcal{E} \) is high and \( \mathcal{L} \) is low, in particular, if \( \mathcal{E} > \left(1 + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right) \mathcal{D} \),
and \( \mathcal{L} \in \left(\max\{\mathcal{H} - \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{D}\}, \frac{\mathcal{H}}{2} + \frac{(\mathcal{H} - \mathcal{D})^2}{2 \mathcal{H}}\right) \), then \( \frac{\partial \mathcal{P}}{\partial \mathcal{L}} > 0 \); otherwise, i.e., if \( \mathcal{H} \in \left(\frac{4}{3} \mathcal{D}, \left(1 + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right) \mathcal{D}\right) \) and/or \( \mathcal{L} \in \left(\frac{\mathcal{H}}{2} + \frac{(\mathcal{H} - \mathcal{D})^2}{2 \mathcal{H}}, \mathcal{H}\right) \), then \( \frac{\partial \mathcal{P}}{\partial \mathcal{L}} < 0 \).

(ii) There exists an \( \tilde{\mathcal{H}} \) such that \( \frac{\partial \mathcal{P}}{\partial \mathcal{H}} > 0 \) for \( \mathcal{H} \in \left(\mathcal{L}, \tilde{\mathcal{H}}\right) \) and \( \frac{\partial \mathcal{P}}{\partial \mathcal{H}} < 0 \) for \( \mathcal{H} \in \left(\tilde{\mathcal{H}}, \mathcal{L} + \mathcal{D}\right) \).

We see from part (i) of Proposition 3 that, when \( \mathcal{H} \) is sufficiently large, training
player 2 by increasing \( \mathcal{L} \) can actually increase the probability of erroneous selection
for low enough levels of \( \mathcal{L} \). In this range, training player 2 does not contribute to
the contest picking the high-ability player; for higher values of \( \mathcal{L} \), training reduces
the probability of picking the wrong winner. We also see that, for low values of \( \mathcal{H} \),
training player 2 always reduces the probability of picking the lower ability player
as winner.

From part (ii), we see that training the ex-ante leader by increasing \( \mathcal{H} \) will
increase the probability of erroneous selection in most cases. The exception is
when \( \mathcal{H} \) is large, in which case further increases will lead to this probability falling,
since the superior player 1 will win in most cases. The exact expression for $\hat{H}$ is given in the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix.

Although we could think of minimizing $\rho^*$ as a way to deal with the selection problem, it is even better to let the principal put more weight on the type-1 error the bigger the difference between the contestants’ ex-post abilities is – we can think of this as minimizing the expected cost of erroneous selection,

$$\Gamma^* = \frac{1}{D^2} \left( \int_L^H \int_{a_1L}^{a_2L} (a_1 - a_2) da_2 da_1 + \int_h^{a_1L} \int_{a_1}^{a_2} (a_1 - a_2) da_2 da_1 \right)$$

$$= \frac{(H - L)^2}{6D^2} \left[ L - \frac{(H - D)^3}{H^2} \right].$$

A principal solely concerned with the ex-post selection problem will seek to minimize $\Gamma^*$. Note again that the prize $v$ plays no role in this problem. The expected cost of erroneous selection is 0 at $L = H$, and also $\Gamma^* > 0$ for $H > L$ since the square bracket in (17) is positive for $L > \frac{(H - D)^3}{H^2}$, which holds.10 Contrary to the probability of erroneous selection, the expected cost $\Gamma^*$ is strictly monotonic in $L$ and $\Gamma$, as shown in the following Lemma.

**Lemma 1** For $L < H$, (i) $\frac{\partial \Gamma^*}{\partial L} < 0$; (ii) $\frac{\partial \Gamma^*}{\partial \Gamma} > 0$. When $L = H$, $\frac{\partial \Gamma^*}{\partial L} = \frac{\partial \Gamma^*}{\partial \Gamma} = 0$.

Given Lemma 1, we have the following:

**Proposition 4** A principal who is solely concerned with minimizing the expected cost of erroneous selection will split the budget as follows.

(i) If $0 < \Gamma \leq H - L$, then $v$ equals a small amount, while the rest of the budget is spent on training to get as close as possible to symmetry.

(ii) If $\Gamma > H - L$, then $s_1 = 0, s_2 = H - L$, so that symmetry is obtained, and $v = B - H + L \geq 0$.

Consider next a principal who balances her concern for total expected efforts and that of the expected costs of erroneous selection. In particular, let her objective function be

$$\Omega^* (k) = kX^* - (1 - k) \Gamma^*$$

$$= k \frac{L(3H - 2D)(H + L)}{6H^2} v - (1 - k) \frac{(H - L)^2}{6H^2D^2} \left[ H^2L - (H - D)^3 \right],$$

where $k \in [0, 1]$ is the weight put on total expected efforts. The cases of $\Omega^* (1)$ and $\Omega^* (0)$ are discussed above, with results presented in Propositions 2 and 4, respectively. There is a clear trade-off that balances the two parts of the objective function, since giving more prize increases contest effort, but leaves less for training, so that the cost of erroneous selection increases. Note from Proposition 2 that, when the budget is exactly $B = \frac{5}{3}H - L$, the principal optimally trains

\[10 \quad L > H - D > \frac{(H - D)^3}{H^2}.\]
the laggard until the contestants are expectedly of equal skill, and hence there will be no selection cost. This means that for $B = \frac{5}{3}H - L$, the principal sets $s_2 = H - L$, $v = B - s_2 = \frac{2}{3}H$, and this is independent of $k$. For budgets below this, the weight $k$ will affect the division between the contest prize and the training given. Again, it is optimal to only train the laggard ($s_1 = 0$, $s_2 > 0$), and we can show the following result:

**Proposition 5** Let $k \in [0, 1]$ be the weight the principal puts on total expected efforts. Let, for each $k$, $T(k) = (t(k), \frac{5}{3}H - L)$ denote a range of the non-negative real line such that, if the principal’s budget $B \in T(k)$, then the principal’s decision to train the laggard is an interior solution $s_2(k) \in (0, H - L)$, so that the laggard receives some training, but not enough to capture the skill level of the leader. Then, in equilibrium, $\frac{dS}{dk} < 0$, and $\frac{dt}{dk} \geq 0$, with $\frac{dB}{dk} > 0$ whenever $t(k) > 0$.

As shown in Proposition 2, the optimal budget division to maximize expected effort involves some training and some contest prize, except for very low budgets. Since the expected cost of erroneous selection is independent of the contest prize, lowering $k$ from 1 gives the principal an extra incentive to train the laggard, and this incentives becomes stronger as $k$ falls. Hence, the budget at which training starts ($t(k)$) is lower, the lower is $k$ except possibly for cases where $t(k) = 0$. Furthermore, the amount of training given when the solution is interior will be increased, the more weight is given to preventing erroneous selection. Proposition 5 is illustrated in Figure 6.\(^{11}\)

In Figure 6, $S(B, k = 1)$ is the total amount spent on training when $k = 1$, and this is increasing in the budget for $B \in (t(1), \frac{5}{3}H - L)$ and constant at

\(^{11}\)Again, this figure is generic but is drawn for parameter values $H = 2$, $L = 1.25$, $D = 1$.  

---

\[Figure 6: \text{Optimal training for different } k\]
$S = H - L$ for $B \in [\frac{5}{3}H - L, 3H - L - \frac{4}{3}D]$; in both cases, only player 2 receives training. Increases in the budget above $3H - L - \frac{4}{3}D$ are divided equally between training both contestants and adding to the prize, according to Proposition 2 so that $S(B, k = 1) = s_1 + s_2$. Decreasing the weight $k$ to expected effort in the objective function increases training of the laggard for all interior solutions, and training starts at lower budgets. After the budget reaches $\frac{5}{3}H - L$, there is no problem of erroneous selection, since the laggard has been trained sufficiently to have the same expected ability as the opponent, and the principal uses any budget increases to increase expected effort.

5 Conclusion

A contest is an often-used mechanism for eliciting effort. When contestants differ in ability or cost of effort, the incentive to provide effort is dampened, and many suggestions have been made as to how an effort-maximizing principal may level the playing field. Remedies such as giving a head start or handicap, or a bias in favour of one player, or requiring threshold levels of effort to obtain a prize are usually costless to the principal. In many real world situations, however, the principal implements a policy to redress the imbalance that has to be paid for from an existing and fixed budget. A sales manager can invest in training her employees for example, leaving a lower bonus to be granted to the “seller of the month”.

We have considered the incentives of a principal to invest in skill-enhancing training that directly reduces the contest prize. Using a model with private information in which the ability distributions of the players overlap, we have shown how an effort-maximizing principal can divide her funds to increase effort through efficiency gains, even when this reduces the contest prize. The potential for realizing efficiency gains depends upon the total size of the budget. If it is too small, then no training will be given at all, and all funds are channelled to the prize. Avoiding choosing the ex-post inferior player as winner gives the principal an extra incentive to train the ex-ante laggard, however; even small budgets may yield training if the cost of erroneous selection is given sufficient weight in the objective function of the principal.

A Appendix

A.1 Proof of Proposition 1

Some properties of the equilibrium outlay functions $x_1^*(a_1)$ and $x_2^*(a_2)$ are standard (see Clark and Riis, 2001). Among these are that the effort functions have a common upper support: $x_1^*(H) = x_2^*(L) = \bar{a}$. For player 1, $x_1^*(h) = 0$ and $x_1^*(a_1) > 0$ for $a_1 > h$. For player 2, $x_2^*(\bar{a}_2) = 0$ for $a_2 \in [l, \bar{a}_2]$, implying an equilibrium effort of zero for these types.
The first-order conditions for maximizing (1) and (2) are:

\[
g'_1(x_1) g_1(x) - \frac{1}{a_1} = 0; \\
g'_1(x_2) g_1(x) - \frac{1}{a_2} = 0;
\]

where \( g'_i(.) \) denotes the first derivative. Substituting \( a_i = g_i(x_i) \) into the first-order conditions gives a system of two differential equations:

\[
g'_2(x_1) g_1(x) = \frac{D}{v}; \quad (A1) \\
g'_1(x) g_2(x) = \frac{D}{v}. \quad (A2)
\]

Summing (A1) and (A2) yields

\[
g'_2(x) g_1(x) + g'_1(x) g_2(x) = \frac{2D}{v},
\]

with general solution

\[
g_1(x) g_2(x) = \frac{2D}{v} x + K. \quad (A3)
\]

The constant of integration, \( K \), is determined by setting \( g_1(x) = H, g_2(x) = L \) into (A3):

\[
HL = \frac{2D}{v} x + K \Rightarrow \\
K = HL - \frac{2D}{v} x;
\]

so that (A3) becomes

\[
g_1(x) g_2(x) = \frac{vHL - 2(\bar{x} - x)D}{v}. \quad (A4)
\]

This can then be used to substitute for \( g_2(x) \) in the first-order condition in (A1):

\[
g'_1(x) - \frac{D}{vHL - 2(\bar{x} - x)D} g_1(x) = 0. \quad (A5)
\]

(A5) has a unique solution up to a constant of integration \( C \):

\[
g_1(x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} C \sqrt{\frac{vHL - 2(\bar{x} - x)D}{D}}. \quad (A6)
\]

We use \( g_1(0) = h \) to recover the constant:

\[
g_1(0) = h = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} C \sqrt{\frac{vHL - 2\pi D}{D}} \Rightarrow \\
C = \frac{\sqrt{2} h}{\sqrt{vHL - 2\pi D}}.
\]
Thus, (A6) can be written

$$g_1 (x) = h \sqrt{\frac{vHL - 2(x - \bar{x})D}{vHL - 2\pi D}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (A7)

We can use $g_1 (\bar{x}) = H$ in (A7) to find $\bar{x}$:

$$g_1 (\bar{x}) = h \sqrt{\frac{vHL}{vHL - 2\pi D}} \Rightarrow \bar{x} = \frac{L (H^2 - h^2)}{2DH} v,$$

so that we can state (A7) as

$$g_1 (x) = \sqrt{\frac{vL^2 + 2DHx}{vL}},$$  \hspace{1cm} (A8)

and $g_2 (x)$ can be recovered from (A4) as

$$g_2 (x) = \sqrt{(vL^2 + 2DHx)Lv}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (A9)

Using $g_1 (x) = a_i$ and inverting (A8) and (A9) give (3) and (4) in the Proposition.

**A.2 Proof of Proposition 2**

Suppose the principal considers the maximization of effort in two stages. At the first stage, she sets the contest prize $v \in [0, B]$ and then, at the second stage, divides up the rest of the budget $B - v$. Working backwards, we first look at the problem of the principal when there is $\Sigma = B - \bar{v}$ of the budget available for training, so that $S = \bar{s}_1 + \bar{s}_2$.

We initially make the assumption that

$$H - L \geq S,$$  \hspace{1cm} (A10)

so that, even if the whole training budget goes to the laggard, he is at best 
ante symmetric to the original leader. Substituting $\bar{s}_2 = S - \bar{s}_1$ into (7) gives the following maximization problem for the principal:

$$\max_{s_1 \in [0, S]} \frac{(L + S - s_1) (3H + 3s_1 - 2D) (H + L + S)}{6 (H + s_1)^2} v,$$

where, for now, $v$ is treated as a constant. The maximand is decreasing in $s_1$ under our assumption that $\frac{H}{D} > \frac{4}{3}$. It follows that, in optimum, no training will be given to 1, and the whole training budget will be given to 2: $s_1 = 0$, and $s_2 = S$. Inserting for $v = B - S$, this means that total expected effort is

$$\frac{(L + S)(H + L + S)(3H - 2D)}{6H^2} v = \frac{3H - 2D}{6H^2} (L + S)(H + L + S)(B - S).$$
So the principal’s maximization problem is now

$$\max_{S \in [0,B]} \frac{3H - 2D}{6H^2} (L + S) (H + L + S) (B - S).$$

The solution can be found as (13), which is positive for $B > \frac{L(H + L)}{H + 2L}$.

When $B \leq \frac{L(H + L)}{H + 2L}$, total effort is falling in $S$, making it optimal to devote the whole budget to the prize as in part (i), i.e. $v = B$. Furthermore, (13) satisfies our condition in (A10) only if the second inequality in (12) holds: $B \leq \frac{3}{2}H - L$. Otherwise, it is optimal to make the players identical through training and thereafter continue training the identical players in order to solve the following problem.

We now have $H = L$, and $H - L$ of the budget already being spent on player 2. So the maximization problem would be, from (8),

$$\max_{Z \in [0,\frac{H - H + L}{2}]} \left( H + Z - \frac{2}{3}D \right) (B - H + L - 2Z),$$

where $Z$ is the amount spent on training each of the two contestants after they have been equalized. The optimal additional amount of training can be determined as $Z^* = \frac{1}{12} (3B - 9H + 3L + 4D)$, which is positive for $B > 3H - L - \frac{4}{3}D$. Inserting $Z^*$ into the expression for total training, $S = H - L + 2Z^*$, we get (14) in part (iv).

When $B \leq 3H - L - \frac{4}{3}D$, the principal will not train the players once symmetry is reached, since $Z^* \leq 0$; hence, in part (iii), $S = H - L$, and the prize is $B - H + L$.

### A.3 Proof of Proposition 3

(i) Calculation shows that $\frac{\partial \phi^*}{\partial L} > 0$ for $\frac{H^2 + (H - D)2}{2H} > L$. Recalling that $L > \max \{H - D, D\}$, we have to check whether the interval

$$L \in \left( \max \{H - D, D\}, \frac{H^2 + (H - D)^2}{2H} \right)$$

is well defined, i.e., whether $\frac{H^2 + (H - D)^2}{2H} > \max \{H - D, D\}$.

(a) Assume first that $H - D > D$, i.e., $H > 2D$. Then $\frac{H^2 + (H - D)^2}{2H} - (H - D) = \frac{4D^2}{2H} > 0$, and the interval is well defined in this case.

(b) Assume next that $D > H - D$, i.e., $2D > H$. Then $\frac{H^2 + (H - D)^2}{2H} - D = \frac{2 + 4HD + D^2 + 2H^2}{H} > 0$ for $H > \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \right) D$.

Combining (a) and (b) gives the result in part (i). If $H > \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \right) D$, then we have $\frac{\partial \phi^*}{\partial L} > 0$ for $L \in \left( \max \{H - D, D\}, \frac{H^2 + (H - D)^2}{2H} \right)$. If $\frac{4D}{3} < H < \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \right) D$, or $L > \frac{H^2 + (H - D)^2}{2H}$, then we have $\frac{\partial \phi^*}{\partial L} < 0$. 

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(ii) Calculation gives \( \frac{\partial \rho^*}{\partial H} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{2H^2(L+D-H)-LD^2}{H^2D^2} \), which is positive when evaluated at \( H = L \), and negative at \( H = L + D \). Furthermore, \( \frac{\partial^2 \rho^*}{\partial H^2} = -\frac{H^3-2LD^2}{H^2D^2} < 0 \), and the only real root of \( 2H^2 (L + D - H) - LD^2 = 0 \) can be calculated as

\[
\tilde{H} = 3 [\sigma + (L + D)] + \frac{(L + D)^2}{\sigma}, \quad \text{where}
\]

\[
\sigma = \frac{1}{6} \sqrt{3} \sqrt{3D \sqrt{L [8 (L^3 - D^3) + 3LD (D - 8L)] + (L + 4D) (2L - D)^2}}.
\]

### A.4 Proof of Lemma 1

(i) Calculation gives \( \frac{\partial \Gamma^*}{\partial \rho} < 0 \) for \( L > \frac{3H^3 - 2D^3 - 6HD(H - D)}{3H^2} \), and this is least likely to hold for low values of \( L \). Recall that the lowest \( L \) is \( \max \{H - D, D\} \). We prove our claim in two steps.

Step 1. Assume first that \( H - D > D \), i.e., that \( H > 2D \). We need to check that \( H - D > \frac{3H^3 - 2D^3 - 6HD(H - D)}{3H^2} \), which implies that \( 3H^2 - 6HD + 2D^2 > 0 \). Given that \( H > \frac{4D}{3} \), \( 3H^2 - 6HD + 2D^2 > 0 \) is satisfied for \( H > \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}} + 1 \right) D \), which must be true, since \( H > 2D > \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}} + 1 \right) D \).

Step 2. Assume next that \( D > H - D \), i.e., that \( 2 > \frac{H}{D} \left( > \frac{4}{3} \right) \). We must show that

\[
D > \frac{3H^3 - 2D^3 - 6HD(H - D)}{3H^2},
\]

which can be shown to hold for \( \zeta := -3H^3 + 3HD(3H - 2D) + 2D^3 > 0 \). It can be determined that \( \zeta = 0 \) has one real positive solution given by

\[
\tilde{\zeta} = \frac{D}{3} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{3} \sqrt{3\sqrt{6} + 9} + \frac{1}{3\sqrt{6} + 9} \right) \approx 2.24D,
\]

and that \( \zeta > 0 \) if and only if \( H < \tilde{\zeta} \), which always holds under our assumption in Step 2 that \( \frac{H}{D} < 2 \).

It follows from Steps 1 and 2 that \( \Gamma^* \) is monotonically decreasing in \( L \) for all \( L \in \{\max \{H - D, D\}, H\} \).

(ii) Calculation shows that \( \frac{\partial \Gamma^*}{\partial \rho} > 0 \) for \( L > \frac{3H^2(H - D)^2}{3H^3 - 3HD^2 + 2D^3} \), which is least likely to hold for low values of \( L \). Note that, if \( L = H - D > D \), then \( \frac{\partial \Gamma^*}{\partial \rho} > 0 \) if \( H - D > \frac{3H^2(H - D)^2}{3H^3 - 3HD^2 + 2D^3} \); this holds for \( 3H (H - D) + 2D^2 > 0 \), which is always true.

If \( L = D > H - D \), then \( \frac{\partial \Gamma^*}{\partial \rho} > 0 \) requires

\[
D > \frac{3H^2 (H - D)^2}{3H^3 - 3HD^2 + 2D^3} = \frac{3H^2 (H - D)^2}{3H (H - D) (H + D) + 2D^3}.
\]

This implies \( 3HD (H - D) (H + D) + 2D^4 > 3H^2 (H - D)^2 \), which can be re-arranged to give

\[
3H (H - D) [D (H + D) - H (H - D)] + 2D^4 > 0.
\]

The term in square brackets is positive, since \( H + D > H \), and \( D > H - D \) for this case, and thus the inequality holds. Hence \( \frac{\partial \Gamma^*}{\partial \rho} > 0 \) always.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5

Letting $\Sigma$ denote training given to the laggard, the principal chooses $\Sigma$ to maximize

$$\Omega^* (k) = k \frac{(L + S)(3H - 2D)(H + L + S)}{6H^2} (B - S) - (1 - k) \left( \frac{(H - L - S)^2 [H^2 (L + S) - (H - D)^3]}{6H^2D^2} \right)$$

$$= kX^* (S, B, H, L, D) - (1 - k) \Gamma^* (S, H, L, D).$$

The first-order condition for an interior maximum is

$$k \frac{\partial X^*}{\partial S} - (1 - k) \frac{\partial \Gamma^*}{\partial S} = 0,$$  \hspace{1cm} (A11)

with second-order condition

$$\frac{\partial^2 \Omega^*}{\partial S^2} < 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (A12)

Totally differentiating (A11) with respect to $S$ and $k$ gives

$$\left( \frac{\partial X^*}{\partial S} + \frac{\partial \Gamma^*}{\partial S} \right) dk + \frac{\partial^2 \Omega^*}{\partial S^2} ds = 0,$$

which, using (A11), can be written as

$$\frac{dS}{dk} = - \frac{\frac{\partial \Gamma^*}{\partial S}}{k \frac{\partial^2 \Omega^*}{\partial S^2}} < 0,$$

where the sign of the numerator is positive from Lemma 1, since $\text{sign} \left( \frac{\partial \Gamma^*}{\partial S} \right) = \text{sign} \left( \frac{\partial X^*}{\partial S} \right)$, and the denominator is negative from (A12).

To see that $\frac{dt}{dk} > 0$ when $t(k) > 0$, consider how $S$ responds to a change in the budget in the range $S \in (0, H - L)$. From (A11), we have

$$\frac{dS}{dB} = - \frac{k \frac{\partial X^*}{\partial BS}}{\frac{\partial^2 \Omega^*}{\partial S^2}} > 0,$$  \hspace{1cm} (A13)

since $\frac{\partial X^*}{\partial BS} = \frac{(3H - 2D)(H + 2L + 2S)}{6H^2} > 0$ and (A12) holds. Now, fix a $B = t(k)$ such that $S(t(k), k) = 0$. Compare this with some $k' < k$, which, since $\frac{ds}{dk} < 0$, implies $S(t(k), k') > S(t(k), k) = 0$. Since $S$ is increasing in $B$, by (A13), it follows that $S(t(k'), k') = 0$ for $t(k') < t(k)$, and hence $\frac{dt}{dk} > 0.$
References


