Partial Information Disclosure in a Contest
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https://doi.org/10.7557/22.5775Lykilorð:
contest, information design, Bayesian persuasionÚtdráttur
Zhang and Zhou (2016) use the concept of Bayesian persuasion due to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to analyze information disclosure in a contest with one-sided asymmetric information. They show that an effort-maximizing designer can manipulate information disclosure to increase expected efforts in the contest, but base their analysis upon active participation in the contest by all types of the informed player. We extend their analysis to equilibria in which some informed types exert no effort in the contest, showing how this changes the type of information disclosure that arises.
Heimildaskrá
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